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Foreword* 
In this paper we intend to deal with some basic elements of Japanese industrial 
relations and simultaneously their counterparts, if there is any, existing in the Hungarian 
industrial relations system. The focus of this paper concentrates mostly on the recent 
features, but in some parts it briefly deals with the preliminaries of the recent situation. 
The followed method is that in the „general introduction" part we shall introduce 
first the Hungarian economic, political and industrial relations background and then the 
basic features of the Japanese industrial relations. After chapter by chapter we deal with 
every one of the indicated features of Japanese industrial relations and enclose the 
Hungarian equivalent institutions or experience, then make some evaluation about the 
possible implementation of the Japanese institute, method, practice etc. in the Hungarian 
environment. 
Finally we intend to collect some of the most important challenges and problems 
of recent development in both systems. 
Beforehand, we would like to remark that the comparison between Japan and the 
recent Hungarian system is not an easy undertaking, because the social, economic, 
political, cultural and traditional background is quite different. Many times, even the 
basic industrial relations terms, like trade union, labor market, and so on are bearing 
different connotations. Generally speaking, only one common phenomenon can be 
found, namely the „challenge situation" which, in Japan, took place after World War II 
and in Hungary is taking place these years. Of course, there are several differences 
between the two challenge situations, but certainly one is common, Hungary has an 
endeavor to stabilize its economy and social order, like Japan did during the last couple 
decades. 
Some words about our technics make the comparison clear. The text which is 
relating to the Hungarian situation is written by normal type letters. The Japanese parts 
are written by italics letters, and the comparative parts are written by bold type letters. 
This method hopefully helps to make this paper more understandable. 
* I am indebted to my colleagues at the Faculty of Law of The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan, 
and at the Department for Labor Law and Social Security of Attila József University, Szeged , Hungary, in 
particular Prof. Kazuo Sugeno, Prof. Masahiro Iwamura, Prof. Takeshi Araki in Tokyo and Prof. László 
Nagy, Prof. Otto Czúcz in Hungary and my colleagues who helped to complete this work. This study was 
supported by the Department of Labor Law at the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo and by 
Monbusho (The Japanese Ministry of Culture), who gave me the chance perform research in Japan. This 
paper is part of a comprehensive study commenced by my distinguished colleagues at the Faculty of Law of 
The University of Tokyo and by several excellent scholars from different, mostly Asian, developing countries. 
— The author is the member of the Department of Labor Law and Social Security Law at the Faculty of Law 
of „Attila József" University, Szeged, Hungary. Recently, he is a visiting Monbusho scholar at The University 
of Tokyo in Japan. 
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1. General introduction 
1.1. Economic and industrial restructuralization in Hungary 
The main aspects of economic and industrial restructuring relate to 
macroeconomics stabilization, trade liberalization, and privatization and enterprise. 
restructuring. The changes in the balance of labor force significantly represents this 
development. See some datas in Table 1.(See tables in appendix). 
1.2. Brief overview of the economic history after the New Economic Mechanism, 1968 
Until the late 1960s, Hungary was a rigidly centrally planned economy. The New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM), adopted in 1968, was the first attempt at limited market 
reforms. The regulatory framework was adjusted, to limit the influence of central 
planning, and to permit more autonomous decision-making by state enterprises. 
Compulsory annual planning for enterprises was abandoned, prices were determined by 
the market forces of supply and demand, and some enterprises were permitted to 
participate directly in foreign trade. 
Further reforms during the second NEM decade after 1979 aimed to increase 
economic efficiency. New pricing regulations were introduced, to connect most 
producer prices directly with foreign trade prices. And multiple exchange rates were 
replaced by a unified rate in order to prepare for the eventual convertibility of the 
Hungarian national currency. The banking structure was reformed, to permit the 
development of autonomous commercial banks. 
1.2.1. The different bank systems and bank-company relationship 
Some words about the different banking systems. In Hungary the banking sector 
is modernized and a two-tier banking system is in place to facilitate the replacement of 
central planning by financial intermediation and so brings market forces in the allocation 
of resources. Banks, however, which are overburdened by inherited bad loans and face 
the problems of undercapitalization in a very risky business environment, are reluctant 
to lend to new entrepreneurs with no reputation and limited collateral. The limited 
knowledge base of the new financial institutions and their bad asset position makes them 
very cautious in investing. 
Recently, in Hungary there is a German-type, bank-based, system in the 
economy. It means that banks are allowed to hold equity and perform part of the 
economy controlling problem. The other type of financial relationship, the so called 
„stock-market based" system is only supplementary. 1 
1  Gabor Hunya ed.: Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe and in the Newly Independent 
States, The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, Yearbook V, Westview Press, 1994, pp. 
152-153. 
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A short comparative remark. In contrast with the Japanese "ziabatsu", later 
keiretsu, practice2 in Hungary the Japanese form of strong bank and company 
relationship does not exist. It means that the Japanese type strong financial, commercial 
and production interrelationships among several small-, medium- and big size 
enterprises does not support the stabilization of the economy. Naturally, the keiretsu 
system is a double sided coin. One side is, a strong and supportive collaboration among 
several participants in the economy which is very prosperous. The other side is, the 
situation of the companies and enterprises which are not able to participate in any of 
keiretsu. They are the losers of the keiretsu system and they are handicapped in the 
manufacturing process and on the market as well. 
After this short comparison between the Japanese and Hungarian bank systems 
we are returning now to the development of the Hungarian economy. Significant efforts 
were also made to promote the development of small private industry, in the urban 
industrial and agricultural sectors. A main feature of the NEM was the development of 
the so-called second economy, in which workers increasingly engaged in productive 
activities outside the formal labor market structure. 
Throughout the 1980's, Hungary borrowed extensively on international capital 
market. In the early 1980s the convertible hard currency debt amounted to 
approximately US$ 8 billion, but rose steadily after that until the gross dollar debt was 
over US$ 20 billion(or some 74 per cent of GDP) by November 1990. 3 
For international financial institutions and other creditors, concerns in recent 
years have related to a debt of over 20 billion US dollars, and also to the budget deficit 
which has been consistently larger than planned. This became a major issue by 1992, 
when in the context of a deep recession social expenditure was greatly exceeding the 
planned budgetary levels. Debt service payments were approximately US$ 3 billion in 
1990, representing a debt-service to exports ratio of 45 per cent. 
2  Zaibatsu and later Keiretsu means an industrial and financial combines of a conglomerate that 
grew to great size and attained a dominant position in the Japanese economy from the Meiji period. In the 
other words, this is a group of affiliated private business enterprises (enterprise groups). Beside the former 
zaibatsu keiretsu, like Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and so on, there are other forms of keiretsu, including 
kinyu (finance), shihon (capital), and kigyo (enterprise). 
The kinyu keiretsu is a group of companies that have their highest borrowing from the bank that 
gives the grouping its name. The banking system has provided the bulk of corporate funds in postwar Japan 
and plays a more important role than shareholders' equity in corporate finance. Therefore, there is a great deal 
of significance to the grouping of companies around a „primary" bank. This is a special and strong interest 
link and tie between a bank(s) and certain companies. 
The above mentioned other two types of keiretsu are not relevant to the current bank system's topic, 
but they organically belong to the basic significant features of Japanese industrial relations. Hence, we intend 
to deal briefly with them. First, the shihon keiretsu, is a group of companies with a common parent company. 
The many subsidiaries of Matsushita Electric from a group of this sort. The parent company in a shihon 
keiretsu typically holds 20-50 per cent of the stock of the subsidiary companies. 
Second, the kigyo keiretsu is a group of companies that do subcontract work for the same firm. Large 
manufacturing companies often engage many small and medium enterprises as subcontractors, which are 
considered part of a keiretsu if they do the bulk of their business with one firm. 
3 Roger Plant: Labor standards and structural adjustment, ILO, Geneva, 1994 p. 138. 
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1.2.2. The adjustment process during the 80s and early 90s: A brief overview 
The industrial policy reform program has been part of a larger reform effort 
aimed at macroeconomics stabilization and greater overall efficiency, centered around 
the three key elements of: a) increasing domestic and external competition; b) tightening 
financial discipline in the enterprise sector; and c) facilitating the mobility of capital and 
labor to enable the restructuring of the industrial sector. It concentrated on the most 
efficient subsectors and enterprises receiving the highest budgetary support; on cutting 
producer and consumer subsidies; 4 on strengthening tax reform; and on providing 
incentives for convertible currency exports. 5 In this assessment, the implementation of 
this program was not very successful through to the end of 1989, as macroeconomics 
management continued to falter, and excessive current account deficits in the balance of 
payments and increasing external financing deficits emerged. Moreover, enforcement of 
financial discipline by the enterprises was seen to lag, as the liquidation and 
restructuring plans of important enterprises were delayed. 
The structural adjustment program was revised, when the interim government 
after 1989, and then the first democratic government (1990-1994) after April 1990, 
strengthened the impetus for reform. The revised program has been supported by an 
IMF Standby Agreement and World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL), approved 
in June 1990. 
The first two years, 1990-1991, of the transition program were marked by 
significant economic contraction, with GDP falling by 4 per cent in 1990 and a further 7 
per cent in 1991. The fall in output was concentrated in the industrial sector, largely as a 
result of the collapse in exports to the CMEA countries. In the meantime, fiscal and 
monetary policies were generally concerned with the objectives of stabilization, debt-
service and reducing the role of the state in the first two years of transition. The rise in 
the budget deficit of 1991 was seen as the inadvertent result of the decline in taxable 
production, and the increased need for social security expenditures. 
As Hungary has experienced difficulties in raising long-term finance from 
commercial lenders, borrowing from the World Bank and regular consultations with the 
IMF have assumed an important role in financial planning. The IMF provided a stand-by 
credit for US$ 360 million in May 1988, and a one-year extension for 1989/90. A 
further 206 million dollar loan from the IMF was agreed in March 1990, and a three-
year compensatory financing facility of US$ 348 million in January 1991. An additional 
4 During the socialist period the budget subsidiary for companies and the consumer price support 
was a common phenomenon. The reason why many companies were supported can be found in the feature of 
dominant state ownership. The state as an "owner" of the companies subsidized their operation. The 
fundamental problem with this subsidy was that it did not vary according to the companies' real performance. 
This public supportive system was a little bit similar to the Japanese zaibatsu. 
5 One of the most important basic problems, with the convertible export, was, which still exists, the 
lack of convertibility of the Hungarian currency. Within the former socialist block special commercial 
relations existed based on the convertible ruble. However, the ruble had only a so-called internal 
convertibility. The problem has been started when the CMEA co-operation system became too narrow for the 
healthy commercial relations and these difficulties enlarged when the system completely collapsed. The 
performers of the Hungarian industry and agriculture without enough convertible currency could not buy 
materials and products properly from the Western markets. Therefore, to survive this difficult situation they 
have had to improve their quality performance and commercial relations with Western markets. This 
endeavor can help to earn enough convertible currency which is necessary to increase their productivity. 
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three-year extended fund facility worth US$ 1.5 billion was approved in February 1991, 
to be utilized for economic stabilization and restructuring. 
Some major indicators of economic crises at the beginning of the 
democratization period in Hungary were as follows: 
the GDP declined by 4.3 %; (see Table 2;3;4) 
internal expenditure and personal consumption decreased by 5.3 % and 4.5 %. 
respectively; 
real wages declined by 5.1 %; 
inflation (consumer price index rose to 28.9 %); 
the number of unemployed rose by 2 % yearly; 
the number of those living under the official subsistence minimum was 
estimated at 10 % to 17 % of the population. 
Although the above figures appear to be frightening, they don't necessarily 
reflect realistic processes (as for their consequences for the workers, however, this 
statement is argued by several experts) due to the great, and growing, importance of the 
secondary economy and related (often clandestine) employment and invisible income in 
Hungary. (see Table 5) That is why it is difficult to see the real situation during this 
transitional period. 6 
1.3. Political context 
The process of economic adjustment was greatly facilitated by political events 
after 1988. More stringent adjustment policies have been adopted, first after 1988 and 
particularly after the free elections of 1990. The stated objective of the new government, 
as set out in its Program for National Renewal, has been to create a so-called „social 
market economy" in which the private sector predominates, but where the more 
vulnerable social groups in society are protected through a social safety net. To this 
effect the government has designed a reform program for the transformation of Hungary 
into a competitive market economy within a 4-5 year period. Unfortunately, the result of 
this program is still waiting for the completion. 
Important elements include fundamental reforms to the structure of ownership 
mainly through privatization programs. (see Table 6;7); the promotion of market 
competition through deregulation and the enforcement of financial discipline; and a 
restructuring of social welfare programs. The reform program is expected to be 
conducted with tight fiscal, monetary and credit policies to ensure macroeconomics 
stability. . 
In Hungary since 1989 in particular almost all elements of society have been 
subject to sizable adjustment. The entire legal and political system is now being 
reformed, as the process of economic and political liberalization have moved in tandem. 
Following the revision of a new Constitution in 1989, all major pieces of social, labor 
and employment legislation have either been revised or are currently in the process of 
revision. New legislation includes the April 1991 Employment Act, the 1992 Labor 
Code, and the 1993 Social Service and Social Institutions Act. 
6 Lajos Héthy: Political changes and the transformation of industrial relations in Hungary, in John 
R. Niland—Russell D. Lansbury—Chrissie Verevis: The future of industrial relations, Global change and 
challenges; Sage Publications, 1994, p. 320. 
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1.4. A short historical overview of the development of Hungarian industrial relations 
The economic transition since the late 1950s was accompanied by more limited 
reforms to the system of labor relations, which was referred to as the liberalization of the 
Stalinist model of industrial relations between 1966 and 1988. As employers and 
enterprises became more autonomous actors, this inevitably affected the role of the 
social partners in economic management. While employer and worker organizations 
continued to be dependent on the Communist Party, a greater role was given first to 
trade unions representatives in determining collective agreements and enterprise wage 
policies, and second to enterprise councils in deciding on major economic issues. These 
enterprise councils were set up in the state sector in the mid 1980s, comprised equally 
management and worker representatives, and were involved in decisions on such issues 
as production planning, marketing and pricing policies.? 
By the middle of the 1990s, although parts of the adjustment process were only 
barely under way, two main issues of concern could be identified. 
First, there were critical labor market issues related to employment policy, 
unemployment, re-employment and re-training (see details later). The level of 
unemployment had reached serious proportions, and further . sharp rises of 
unemployment were anticipated over the coming years. Though significant 
unemployment had been seen as inevitable in short term, as a necessary consequence of 
privatization and reduction of over-manning in state enterprises, the extent of 
unemployment had nevertheless exceeded expectations, and was causing a ce: tain 
amount of rethinking as to the relative priority to be given to active and passive 
employment policies. 
Second, there were the issues related to the emerging industrial relations system, 
and the role of the social partners in economic restructuring. The Government has had to 
decide what aspects of labor relations should be regulated by law, to what extent is 
should intervene in issues including wage-fixing and employment security, and to what 
extent these matters should be left to bipartite negotiations between employer and 
worker groups. 8 
One more issue has to be mentioned, namely what is the importance of the labor 
relations system during the transitional period is. 
On the one hand, conflicts in the relationships of workers, employers and the 
state have kept accumulating because of a decline in real wages (minus 20 per cent in 
the period 1978-88), rising inflation (20-30 per cent in the early 90s), an erosion of 
social benefits and menacing unemployment in particular because of the government's 
austerity policies. In this circumstances a well-functioning labor relations system is 
necessary. 
On the other hand, a market economy and parliamentary democracy in 
Hungary is going to need institutional guarantees for the settlement of conflicts and the 
maintenance of cooperation among workers, employers and the State. 9 Some of these 
guarantees were enacted in the new Labor Code in 1992. 
8 Roger Plant, pp. 142-143. 
9 Lajos Héthy: Hungary's Changing Labour Relations System, in György Széll, ed.: Labour 
Relations in Transition in Eastern Europe, Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1992, pp. 175-176. 
8 
7 Roger Plant: Labor standards and structural adjustment, ILO, Geneva, 1994 p. 142. 
10 Article 14, Hungarian Labour Code, 1992. 
11 Articles 42-69, Hungarian Labour Code, 1992. 
12 Roger Plant: Labor standards and structural adjustment, ILO, Geneva, 1994 pp. 156-157. 
1.4.1. The new Labor Code, 1992 
The new Labor Code's concept, as well as the institutions that it introduced, and 
the regulations that it established, answers the standards of a market economy besides 
expressing the basic principles laid down in previous decades, weighed-down with 
overengineered, bureaucratic ties — it gives voluntary agreements of employers and 
employees first place. It lays down the rules and guarantees the freedom to organize into 
trade unions, institutionalizes workers' participation, creates the institution of work 
councils, and introduces a new process of settling labor disputes. 10  
Indeed, a Ministerial introduction to the Labor Code bill suggested that the 
underlying premise is a minimum regulation, providing for the withdrawal of state 
intervention, setting only the minimum standards for an employment relationship and 
leaving all other matters to negotiation by the contracting parties. 
In addition, the legislators' undeclared intention was „to share attractive 
conditions of labor employment for foreign capital, to stimulate private investments 
primarily from abroad by offering them relatively cheap labor with little trade union 
protection and with little word in managerial decisions by employee participation (at 
least in comparison to West European standards)". 
Perhaps the new Labor Code's major feature is to move away from the detailed 
and compulsory regulation that characterized labor law earlier, and to leave the 
maximum possible number of issues to free negotiation among the parties concerned. 
One provision, dealing with trade union, of possible significance in the context of 
privatization is Article 22, stating that „Trade unions may request information from 
employers with respect to all issues that affect the employees' economic interests in 
relation to their employment. Employers must not refuse to provide such information or 
justification for their action." 
Participate rights are exercised in the employees' name by the works council or 
the shop floor officer, elected by them; and the works council has to be elected at every 
employer and every business establishment where the number of employees is over 50 
people.l 1 There are also provisions requiring the employer to elicit the opinion of the 
works council on issues including measures such as privatization that will impact upon a 
major group of employees, plans for employee training or ideas concerning employment 
subsidies, or the introduction of new methods for work organization and performance 
requirements. 12 
1.4.2. New perspectives in the industrial relations 
In 1989-1990 new perspectives opened up for changes in industrial relations. 
These included: 
the exclusion of the Communist Party (and any political actors) as a participant 
in industrial relations; 
the final separation of government, trade unions and employer's organizations, 
the latter appearing on the scene as autonomous actors dependent on their membership; 
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the lifting of the legal barriers imposed on free collective bargaining (by the 
Labor Code amendments of 1989 and the new Labor Code, 1992) and efforts to build up 
a multilevel mechanism of bargaining; 
the recognition of collective labor disputes, including those over interests 
(Strike Act was adopted in 1989); 
the establishment of a national tripartite institution of social consultation 
(National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests); and 
the adaptation of the earlier schemes of workers' participation to the conditions 
of privatization and a market economy (Workers Ownership Program, and work 
councils). 
There are still a lot of experiences for Hungary to learn from the reorganization 
of large state-owned companies in Western Europe and Japan over the past 15 years 
which is of relevance to the intensively emerging privatization period in Hungary. The 
streamlining of public sectors companies in the market economies was in most cases not 
achieved through a sudden regime-change but through the gradual but sustained 
imposition of an „increasingly hardening budget constraint". 13 
The current situation, as above mentioned, in Hungary is, in one respect, similar 
to Japan after the Second World War when it embarked upon industrial policy. At that 
time Japan had a clear vision of which product markets to enter and which industries to 
develop. The example of the developed market economies determined the pattern. In a 
sense the same is true now for the Hungarian economy. The broad trends of market 
reorientation are known. The basic direction, in Hungary as well, in sectoral reallocation 
is clear: increase the role of tertiary activities, reduce the share of heavy industrial, 
heavy chemical, and metal-producing industries. 14 
In addition, Japan had a clear economic and political aim, namely to catch up 
with the developed nations, mostly with the developed Europe and with the USA, and 
politically to set inevitably up the institutions of democracy. Therefore, the export 
orientation is a clearly distinguishing characteristic of successful catching-up processes. 
Most of the successful catching-up economies made export performance a central target 
around which the overall process was organized. 
Contrary, in the Hungarian case, the shortage of hard currency and the heavy 
burden of foreign debt makes it even more important to exert strong pressure on export 
performance. . 
There are a number of additional factors which are inevitable during the 
transitional period in Hungary, such as: 
the dramatic impact of the loss of traditional CMEA export markets; 
the strong pressure exerted by international organizations (i.e. IMF, World 
Bank) to achieve external balance and at the same time Hungarian government's desire 
to join to the EC; 
the high demand for imports both for consumption purposes as well as an 
important ingredient into the process of restructuring itself. 15 
13 Gabor Hunya ed.: Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe and in the Newly 
Independent States, The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, Yearbook V, Westview Press, 
1994, pp. 147-148. 
14 Gabor Hunya, pp. 148-149. 
15 Gabor Hunya, pp. 149-150. 
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There are a number of areas which can play a significant role during the 
transition period and even after it. These are: 
- infrastructural investment; 
training; 
Research and Development activity; 
financial institutions (especially which have some distinguished aim, like 
support for small- and medium size enterprises, etc.; 
small- and medium size enterprises; 
takeover and merger policies and control; 
joint ventures; 
- foreign direct investments (see Table 8); 
privatization; and 
export promotion. 
For example, the infrastructural investment and development is a very important 
aspect of industrial support. Transport and communication facilities are generally seen 
as an important bottleneck in the development of industrial activities. Some experts 
estimate that the annual loss of GDP directly related to the poor level of 
telecommunications services amounts to 4-5 per cent of GDP in Hungary. An additional 
3-4 per cent is accounted for by the lack of reliable road transportation and a further 
2-3 per cent loss comes from environmental damage. 16 
After the brief Hungarian introduction we shall introduce some basic elements of 
the Japanese industrial relations. 
1.5. General introduction to Japanese industrial relations 
First of all, before discussing some inevitably important elements of the Japanese 
industrial relations we would like to present here some general datas, as basic 
background information, about the Japanese labour market. (see Table 9, 10, 11). 
From now, we are concentrating on the special issues of Japanese industrial 
relations system Generally quoted basic pillars of Japanese industrial relations are: a) 
lifetime employment; b) seniority-based wages; c) enterprise unions, and d) the 
philosophy of cooperative management. 
Three of the basic elements of Japanese industrial relations, namely lifetime 
employment, seniority-oriented promotion and enterprise-based unions, were criticized, 
mainly by American scholars, as being reflections of feudalism. One of the main reason 
for this blame is that lifetime employment, seniority-based systems and enterprise unions 
are solely the patterns of male workers in large-size enterprise. 17  This used to be 
considered as a special feature of the Japanese industrial relations model. 
As a matter of fact, these features of Japanese industrial relations in question 
differ from the cases of small-size enterprise workers and female workers, who are not 
entitled to lifetime employment nor to seniority-based promotion, although they are 
associated with the large-size enterprise workers who played the central role in Japan's 
economy after the war. Enterprise unions are not popular among small-size enterprises, 
17 Mikio Sumiya: The Japanese industrial relations reconsidered, The Japan Institute of Labour, 
Tokyo, 1990, p. 136. 
16 Gabor Hunya, pp. 150-151. 
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22 Industrial relations system in Japan, A new interpretation, Yasuo Kuwahara, Japan Institute of 
Labour, 1989, p. 8. 
18 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 122-123. 
19 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 127-128. 
20 Mikio Sumiya, p. 134. 
21 Mikio Sumiya, p. 136. 
either. The percentage of large-size enterprise male workers, who are involved in this 
system, is therefore lower than 30 % of the total workforce. 18  
The co-operative type Japanese style labor-management relations are not as those 
between two distinct identities, labor and management, but are relations that connect 
both parties in an inclined relationship. Labor is, therefore, accepted as a member of the 
organization and is not regarded as an alien component. 19 
However, reflecting on the cooperative management-labor relations practice 
Abbeglen writes: It (Japanese industrial relations) is in many ways a more human, less 
brutal system of employment than the West has developed. It certainly is characterized 
by less conflict. Both its economic effectiveness and its social value work to maintain 
the system. 
Another feature of the Japanese industrial relations system is the so called 
„personalistic internal industrial relations". Personalism regulates the whole employment 
relations, in that blue collar workers who have worked for certain periods are promoted 
to foreman, and white collar workers can be promoted to managers. In Western 
countries, as well as in Hungary, there is a difference between foreman and workers, a 
distinction between the manager and the managed, which does not allow, or very 
seldom, promotion from the lower to the higher. In Japan, however, this promotion is a 
routine matter of course, with no social or psychological discord among workers who 
work under such a foreman.20 
Personalistic industrial relations are not regulated by job function or framed by 
the workers' manpower, but by personal properties, such as sex, age, education, 
experience and length of service. 21 
Consequently, the lack of opposition and dispute between labor and management, 
mostly in big companies, may be the most important feature for summarizing labor-
management relations in modern Japan.22 
We call the Japanese industrial relations a multiply distinct system. One reason is 
that the above mentioned basic characteristics of the Japanese system can be applied 
only for male employers in big companies. Inevitably, they are the backbone of the 
Japanese industry, especially if we are taking into account the feature of kigyo type 
keiretsu system which involves many of the small- and medium size enterprises in the 
big mother company's interest circles. Consequently, this keiretsu virtually behaves as a 
unified big company. Second, the increasing number of irregular workers (part-timers, 
contract workers etc. and small- and medium size companies, mainly because of the 
change in the industrial structure, give a new perspective and challenge for the 
traditional Japanese type industrial relations system. Third, the cyclical characteristics of 
world economy, which play an increasingly important part in the Japanese economy, the 
emerging of new challenging fields in the tertiary sector, like services, research, 
development, communication and result in the companies making significant efforts to 
be as flexible as possible. 
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If these two trends, namely sectorial changes and the cyclical features of world 
economy, are taken into account simultaneously, we hardly believe that the Japanese 
internal labor market will be able to give a proper answer to this double challenge. One 
example: during the so-called oil crises in the 70s and 80s the Japanese economy and 
industrial relations could survive without significant negative losses. Naturally, for the 
sake of stabilization the Japanese government and employers made an enormous 
endeavor. We believe that the main contributor to this success was a) the existence of 
the internal market, b) the enlarging irregular type employment relations and the single, 
only economic, challenge. At that time the second challenge, namely structural changes, 
has not been appeared in the widespread manufacturing industry. On the other words, 
the Japanese economy basically had to face to only one serious problem. That was the 
economic crisis. In that time the second challenge, namely bulk sectorial changes or 
restructurization of the industry and market, has not yet appeared. On the contrary, the 
sectorial changes helped to settle the economic crises. Unfortunately, recently the above 
mentioned double challenge, economic crisis and restructuralization, appear together 
and cause serious problems for Japanese enterprises. 
It is not so surprising that the so called „Lion-like feature" of Japanese 
companies, mostly small- and medium size and some big ones, has been increasing. It 
means that they are eager to keep their subsidiaries and subcontractors alive, because 
this is their own interest. In a pinch, they would not hesitate to sacrifice them if their 
interest required it. 
Another fundamental issue (bottom-up management) is whether the „typical" 
Japanese company is really the bureaucratic type (workers can become managers and 
even directors as a matter of seniority based order, the company where top management 
derives purely from inside promotion of hardworking life-time employed salarymen). 
However, many directors are the founders of certain big, but most often small- and 
medium size companies. It may even occur that not only are they presidents but their 
children, relatives and in-laws are company officers and so on. This is some kind of 
survival of zaibatsu. Naturally, more democratic companies where ownership is more 
diffuse, tended to spread control more widely. 
Furthermore, there is the so called ringi-sho or memos written by lower level 
personnel and channeled upward for approval. Furthermore, there are meetings or kaigi, 
and nemawashi (or root-binding), where someone promoting an idea consults 
individually with those concerned, winning them over one by one. All looks very 
Japanese, but the question obviously arises, whether this system can work in the 
international competition. 
1.6. Basic consideration of the human structure of Japanese industrial relations 
The industrial relations in Japan are far from the European class structure model 
and also far from the American model. Because they have an extremely ambiguous 
distinction between labor and management. In more positive terms, the two are 
indiscreet. From historically aspects, that unskilled workers in labor markets in Japan 
became skilled workers by accumulating experience; skilled workers climbed several 
steps to fill the positions of shop managers, from foreman to low level engineer. This 
upward movement, from worker to foreman after the worker had served for a certain 
13 
length of time, still exists today in work places where the Western type distinction 
between the manager and the worker is not present. The manager and the managed are 
indiscreet in this sense. 
In this sense, industrial relations in Japan are neither genuine class relations nor a 
vertical two-layer structure and can be termed „inclined" industrial relations. However, 
the worker could become a low level manager by accumulating experience, and rise 
further to become the owner of a small-size enterprise in a society in which indiscreet 
relations between managers and labor were maintained. This situation has been 
institutionalized as a seniority based system. 23 
The whole Japanese factory is organized from top to bottom and up again in a 
systematic, circular method. This means that delegation of duties, understanding of what 
needs to be done, discussion of decision-making, quality control, worker input, manager 
input, is structured as a complete system, with no separations or unlinked elements. This 
systematic approach is very much akin to the way the Japanese society functions. 
Everyone knows their positions, their place, and understands their relationship to 
everyone else and what they have to do. 
A good example of this philosophy is the way that quality, „just in time" method, 
or „Kaizen", continuous improvement processes are not implemented in isolation, as it is 
often the case in Western companies, but take place in a holistic systematic way that 
permeates the entire organization. 24 
In the paternalistic management system in which workers are members of the 
enterprise, the employer prepares for workers to serve for a long periods and adopts 
lifetime employment as the ideal choice in his fundamental employment policies. 
Workers expect employment security and promotion in the enterprise where they are 
employed, and eventually work there until their age limit. 
In small- and medium-sized enterprises, however, paternalistic relations such as 
the lifetime employment system have not been fully implemented yet, due to their 
unstable business operation and the limitations of chances for promotion and wage 
increase. 
A number of older managers said that they felt the Japanese huge economic 
development had happened because of the tremendous insecurity that had occurred after 
the Second World War and the poverty many of their families had suffered. Certainly, 
the experience made many of these people very fearful of poverty and of lower 
standards of living. 25 
The above mentioned stimulation was typical of the post-war generation. 
Nowadays, two new groups have appeared in the Japanese society. One is the „dankai 
no sedai",people in their fourties, who experienced various influences, like the wind of 
democratization after the war and the student movement in their school age in the 60s, 
the consequence of the baby boom effect, namely the continuos competition in their life 
and so on. Second, is the „D.I.N.Ks" or Double Income No Kids generation. They were 
born in the wealthy, their life is without significant social problems and they pursue a 
relatively carefree life. 
23 Mikio Sumiya, p. 125. 
24 Ruth Taplin: Decision-making and Japan, Japan Library, 1995, p. 66. 
25 Ruth Taplin, p. 78. 
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In addition, the increasing number of students studying abroad also bring some 
„western" effect into the Japanese society and naturally into the workplace relations as 
well. 
2. Lifetime Employment System 
Lifetime employment as one of the basic phenomena of the Japanese industrial 
relations system is well known. This is also one of the core points of the effective 
employment security policy. 
At the beginning of industrialization in Japan lifetime employment was not 
known. Instead, in the early stage of industrialization the high labor mobility was the 
significant feature. In that sense in the initial period the Japanese and Western industrial 
relations had the same structure. 
At the beginning of Japanese industrialization the family-ism in management was 
common, then at the beginning of the 20th century this got under way with all the 
necessary conditions in its favor. The sudden expansion of the economy resulting from 
World War I was accompanied by the upheaval of the labor market. The shortage of 
labor, especially skilled labor, greatly stimulated labor mobility. Even workers who had 
been trained at great costs by a particular enterprise were often lured away to other 
factories by higher salaries. 26  
Because of the lack of skilled employees intensive movement from one company 
to another endangered the stability of labor relations. To stop the huge labor fluctuation 
and for the sake of stability in the industrial relations it seemed necessary to introduce a 
new labor policy. In their relation to the labor market, the new policies appeared in the 
form of a system of hiring labor only at a fixed time, once a year, and also a system of 
pay rises at regular intervals. The new system of regular pay increase, though likewise 
predicated on the assumed relationship between the years of experience (length of 
service) and the degree of skill (ability of the worker), was introduced essentially as a 
means of lengthening the period of the workers' continuous service. 
The result of this system was twofold: One, a worker who had once worked with, 
and then quit, a large company, found it impossible or very difficult at best to get a job 
in another large enterprise again. Second, because the duration of the service became the 
greatest determining factor, a worker's, who quit and was hired again, former years of 
experience would be evaluated, in terms of pay increase scale, at a rate lower than if he 
had served with the company from the beginning. Therefore, the lifetime employment 
system together with the seniority based wage system gives a great impetus to the 
workers for staying with one company for a long period of time. 
Under the system of long-térin employment working conditions were largely 
determined within each enterprise, on the basis of its business performance and through 
union-management negotiations. 27 
26 Mikio Sumiya, p. 34. 
27 Mikio Sumiya, p. 58. 
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2.1. Formal and informal training schemes 
One of the basic elements of the Japanese life time employment and total quality 
management (see later) is the continuous and general training. In the Japanese company, 
on the job, training is part of the whole system just as other aspects, such as quality 
control, are integrally linked to all aspects of company organization. 
While in western companies, among them Hungarians as well, training tends to 
be very much compartmentalized and done on a specialized, formalized basis. The 
western managers, rather than learning through role-models and mentors, which is 
generally accepted in Japan, learned by being given responsibility quite early on in their 
job training. They were given challenging assignments in which they had to learn, 
otherwise they would fail — a kind of sink or swim survival mentality. 
In Hungary we call it: „throw into the deep water" practice, which means that 
without exact and elaborated preliminary training or even if he/she has a good training, 
but has no or not enough practical skill, he/she has to fulfill certain job or position and 
find his/her own way in the new work environment. 
Another significant fact is that the majority of Japanese managers have university 
or even some kind of post-graduate degree from one of the well known Japanese or 
foreign universities (see Table 12). 
Hence, the managers often knew each other as peer group members from the 
same university. (I call this phenomenon some kind of second zaibatsu or personal 
interest-linkage.) This is a very important cohesion. 
Higher education in Japan is often integrally linked to the needs of business. 
Contrary, in Hungary the relationship between industries and universities is weak. 28 
2.1.1. Human resource training problems in Hungary 
Past industrial development has led to a dramatic underdevelopment of certain 
skills and activities, particularly managerial skills, marketing, product design etc. In such 
conditions, where the general level of the skill of production workers is high but 
important complementary skills and activities are missing or are in very short supply, 
one can expect strong effects of industrial policies if one is able to stimulate the supply 
of those complementary inputs. 29 
As the World Bank report, in 1989, argues, an underlying problem is the 
inadequacy of the education and training system for the emerging market economy in 
Hungary. A mismatch between existing skills and new requirements is seen as pervasive. 
First, appropriate retraining and adult education must be instituted to facilitate 
the reentry of displaced workers to the labor market. 
Second, the education system must be reoriented to provide better training to 
the new generations. The quality and cost effectiveness of youth training and higher 
education are seen as particularly urgent (see Table 13). 
29 Gabor Hunya ed.: Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe and in the Newly 
Independent States, The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, Yearbook V, Westview Press, 
1994, p. 144. 
28 Ruth Taplin, pp. 80-82. 
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World Bank credits have also been provided for the strengthening of employment 
services, through its Third Industrial Restructuring Project. Resources have been 
provided for the development of model employment services, including: program 
planning and evaluation systems; occupational information, assessment and job search 
strategies; and industrial adjustment services for mass lay-offs. 30 
Reforms to the training system as related to employment, including vocational 
training within schools and adult education, have been an important aspect of the 
transition program. Institutional responsibilities have been divided between the Ministry 
of Education, responsible for the administration of youth training in secondary 
vocational schools; and the Ministry of Labor, responsible for the vocational curriculum. 
An autonomous National Training Council has been created to administer adult training, 
funded by the employment fund and the state budget. 
3.2. Seniority system 
Another, above mentioned, basic characteristic of Japanese industrial relations is 
the seniority system. However, the seniority-based system in Japan applies not only to 
wages but also to promotions. It means, when a worker has served in the same company 
with a good record for 15 or 20 years, he is automatically promoted to foreman. There is 
thus a continuous flow of rank-and-file workers moving up to the position of foreman. 
Two important element of the seniority system are — the age of the worker and his 
length of service — the latter was more emphasized in the pre-war years. After World 
War II, the emphasis has shifted to the age element. 
The systems of promotion and wage determination do not basically operate with 
reference to the job but to a worker's personal attributes. They are essentially seniority-
based systems. The wage rates based on seniority or years of service are then 
supplemented through a system under which basic wages are raised for individual 
workers by a set annual increment at a specified time. In addition, the amount and pace 
of wage increase also vary slightly according to a worker's ability and his/her merits. 31 
Historically, in Japan the employer's initiative was important in the formation of 
the seniority system. But, as a contrary action the unions aimed to weaken workers' 
loyalty to their forms which were behind the seniority system. The labor unions have 
endeavored to reduce the roles played by employers in the revaluation of skills, 
performance and conduct of workers, with a view to checking the subjectivity and 
arbitrariness of employers, and mitigating the „loyalty competition" among workers. 32 
The nenko-based (seniority-based system) skills are one of the basic determinants 
of Japanese industrial relations as they constitute a system of administered wages, which 
on the one hand makes workers receptive to the paternalist ideology, and on the other 
hand functions as the pillar of lifetime commitment and a guarantee for subsistence, 
including lifetime employment, advancement, wage promotion, severance payment, and 
fringe benefits, thereby making the status-based hierarchy cover the entire labor force. 33 
30 Roger Plant, pp. 147-148. 
31 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 67-68. 
32 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 51-52. 
33 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 70-71. 
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Naturally, some kind of seniority system exists in Hungary too. It appears mostly 
in the wage differences and some promotion among blue-collar workers and 
administrative office workers. However, the strictly regulated and one way Japanese 
seniority system is unknown in Hungary. Nowadays, in managerial circles the age does 
not matter, because everything is determined by the actual skill. It is not rare to see top 
managers in their thirties and early fourties. They are success motivated persons and 
their employer knows it and intentionally hires them to fulfill some task or drive the 
company into success. 
4. Labor Unions 
4.1. The socialist type unions and their „transmission belt" roles in the early socialist 
period in Hungary 
4.1.1. The main changes in the trade unions during the early communist period 
The communist political power began (in 1948) to enforce the re-shaping of the 
trade union movement in three main spheres: 
organization and structure; 
personnel (we shall not deal with it here) and 
function. 
The organizational re-shaping of the basically craft-based and locally organized trade 
union movement was formally decided at the 25th Congress of the Trade Unions in 
1949. The Congress proclaimed that a) there was a single interest in society and that the 
party had the authority to designate and guide trade union policy and practice. It 
required, secondly, that b) the affiliated unions amalgamate and reorganize themselves 
on monopolistic industrial lines in 19 branch unions. c) Third, the locally organized 
union sections were required to reorganize into enterprise sections, whilst the company-
level multi-union system had to reorganize itself into a one-company one-union system. 
The enterprise union section had, moreover, to unite all employees regardless of their 
professional divisions and without distinction between the rank-and-file and managerial 
personnel, even up to and including the director of the company. d) Finally, the internal 
organizational principle was to be democratic centralism. This meant that once a 
decision had been passed by central organs, like polit-bureau or SZOT, it was obligatory 
to implement it without expressing opposing opinions. 
The functional re-consideration. A new set of functions was determined for the 
re-shaped and now subordinated trade unions. These were, first, to organize the workers 
for the over-fulfillment of the production plans, to organize the various socialist 
emulation campaigns — such as Stakhanov campaign — and to combat shirkers and norm 
defrauders. A second of their functions was to take part in distributing the state and 
enterprise welfare benefits and to organize communal entertainment and cultural 
programs. In this role the unions functioned as a quasi-governmental department at the 
national level and as a welfare department of the firm. Thirdly, the unions provided a 
career for future cadres. 
The unions thus became a subordinate organization of the oppressive political 
dictatorship. They were directly guided and controlled by the communist party at every 
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level of their activity. The unions were the „transmission belt" conveying central 
economic policy. The centralization of economic management and the direct and tight 
government control over production and wage rates terminated any scope for bargaining 
over performance or wages. The unions were detached from their original social 
functions: from the integration of workers into professionally based organizations, from 
achieving autonomy, fair wages and conditions for their members through the control of 
a given segment of the labor market and the work process, and through collective 
bargaining. The new function of the unions became, through fulfillment of the 
transmission belt role, to restrain worker demands. As the official workers' interest-
representing organization became a part of the political-economic management, the 
function of such a union was to prevent a particular worker's interest from being raised 
and to render impossible formalized action to safeguard terms and conditions. Although 
almost every worker was obliged to become a trade union member, the members could 
not control the organization. 
Because of severe political suppression, the separation of the interests of workers 
and the party controlled trade unions could only be manifested in the 1956 revolution. 
During the revolution of that year the workers began to set up workers' councils and the 
trade unions effectively ceased to exist at the workplace level. In the last days of the 
revolution, the workers' council began to form regional and national-level bodies. 34 
After the revolution of 1956 the earlier trade-union structure was restored though 
with strict party control. After the consolidation, the Kadar regime strove to avoid the 
extreme hard-line Stalinist policies and committed itself to raising the standard of living. 
From the mid-1960s, a slow reform began leading towards a more enlightened political 
regime and a mixed economy. This was accompanied by a loosening of the tightly 
centralized economic management. After the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism in 1968, the independence of enterprises from central government grew 
substantially. Each company could build up its own internal production methods, 
management style, labor policy, internal labor market and welfare policy. As the 
political and economic environment of the unions changed, the viability of a 
transmission role for the unions decreased. 
The expectation that trade union organization could be tightly controlled and 
dominated by the center ceased to exist. Trade unions were able to adopt a double 
function. The transmission belt role was retained, but they could take up the 
representation of workers' interests. The SZOT policy of top-down determination of 
lower union affairs eased. The facade of the monolitich industrial structure of the trade 
union movement however, remained untouched. The centralized structure survived and 
maintained an independent policy-making role in the upper layers of the trade union 
hierarchy. But this upper level gradually lost control over the enterprise union sections. 
A covert enterprise unionism began to develop behind the unaltered facade of the 
monolitic union structure. The enterprise union sections began to coordinate their 
activity with the interests of their enterprise. Through this development, these sections 
became the partners of their company management rather than transmission belts at the 
disposal of the upper union headquarters. The interest representation of the workers 
34 András Tóth: Great Expectations — Fading Hopes: Trade Unions and System-Change in Hungary; 
Parties, trade unions and society in East-Central Europe, ed.: Michael Waller and Martin Myant, Frank Cass 
Ltd., 1994 , pp. 86-89. 
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therefore came to mean greater interest representation of a given company in its struggle 
for more resources from redistribution agencies at government level. 
The development towards enterprise unionism was legitimated finally by the 
amendment of the Labor Code in 1968. The Code outlawed multi-employer collective 
bargaining, and preserved and arbitration right for the upper level of the union hierarchy 
only in cases of disagreement at the company level between management and the 
enterprise's trade union section. The Code had decentralized all trade union rights to the 
enterprise level making collective bargaining at the company level between employers 
and the respective trade union section obligatory. 
The Code also designated a new role for the enterprise sections. These were 
given the power to exercise participation rights as the representative of all employees in 
the given enterprise.35 
4.1.2.1. The structure of the company union section 
As we mentioned earlier, each enterprise had only one union section. Virtually all 
employees were members of this section, including top management of the company. 
The union section's organizational structure followed that of the enterprise. Each 
level of the company hierarchy had a corresponding union activist partner: a shop 
steward corresponded to a foreman, a senior shop steward corresponded to a supervisor 
and a union secretary corresponded to the director respectively. 
Alongside the vertical structure there were trade union committees corresponding 
to the functional departments of the management: the social and welfare committee 
corresponded to the welfare department, whilst the economic committee corresponded to 
the financial department. The executive committee was the top board of the section. It 
consisted of senior shop stewards and presidents of the functional committees. 
Democratic centralism remained the internal organizational principle. The company's 
party organization exercised control over the staffing and policy of the union section. 36 
4.1.2.2. Twofold role: Manager and trade union leader positions in the same hand 
One of the main characteristics of the staffing practice of the enterprise unions 
was the enforcing of managerial personnel into union leadership positions. 
Occupation of union leadership positions was usually by middle and lower 
management. The majority of cases, the shop steward and senior shop steward positions 
were occupied by foremen, head of the sections or deputy supervisors. The president of 
the executive committee was a deputy supervisor, who was also the senior shop steward 
at his shop. The supervisor of the maintenance shop was the chair of the economic 
committee of the trade union section — although a foreman was the senior shop steward 
at this maintenance shop. 
Besides this doubling of roles, the relationship between management and unions 
was also determined by personal relationships. 
35 András Tóth, pp. 89-90. 
36 András Tóth, pp. 90-91. 
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Because of the tendency for management to hold union leadership positions the 
workers could not depend on the union to defend them against management arbitrariness 
and represent their interests against the management. Many times the unions even placed 
themselves on the side of management and turned against the workers' interest. 37 
The workers, however, were able to develop individual strategies to compensate 
for the missing union roles, the unions themselves becoming indifferent to the workers' 
viewpoint. Most of the employees could make up for their disadvantaged positions in 
their employment through the second economy. The second economy gave workers the 
possibility of reshaping their expectations towards the enterprise. They could work out a 
balance between internal labor-market positions and second economy activities. 
The coincidence of a labor shortage and this second economy allowed the 
workers to accept the goal of the management to create an internal labor market. In 
response, the workers developed different labor market strategies. 
Because the trade unions were expropriated by the management and there was a 
ban on grassroots associations, the workers through turnover, absenteeism or going slow 
covertly and informally tried to safeguard their individual interests and informal 
bargaining. It was possible to break the contract and easily find other work, because of 
the labor shortage. Through overmanning it was possible to occupy a relatively low-
grade job in exchange for relatively loose management control and relatively low 
expectations of efficiency, and work in the second economy. 
4.1.2.3. Co-operative collaboration 
Co-operative collaboration connotes the way in which an enterprise union acted 
and practiced its rights. The relationship was characterized by mutual trust between the 
management and the union rather than antagonism and confrontation. 
One good example of co-operative collaboration was the negotiation process of 
the collective agreement. This process consisted of the following steps. First, the 
director of the company and the secretary of the company trade union section sent a 
jointly-signed letter to every supervisor and to the corresponding senior shop 
stewards. 38  Second, every shop-floor local section of the union held a meeting with its 
shop steward and with the representative foreman. 39 At the meeting, they decided 
together which questions should be amended in the agreement. Third, shop stewards 
held a meeting at senior shop steward supervisor level, where they summarized the 
amendments. The corresponding supervisor also participated in that meeting. They made 
a common decision, which led to cases being taken to enterprise level. They composed a 
joint record which contained positive and in very few cases negative proposals as well. 
Fourth, the executive committee of the section, with the participation of the director, 
made proposals to amend the company collective agreement. Fifth, the trade union 
executive committee negotiated with top management to sign the agreement. 40 
37 András Túth, p. 94. 
38  This letter states that the existing agreement is about to expire and calls upon them to evaluate the 
implementation of the agreement and make their proposals to amend it. 
39 At these meetings, the workers expressed their problems concerning the agreement and proposed 
amendments to it. 
40 András Túth, pp. 92-93. 
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It has to be remarked that the contents of the collective bargaining were not 
significant. The logic of the socialist industrial relations, if existed any, was centralized. 
Namely, every important issue related to the working conditions, as well as the wage 
system was regulated centrally by the Parliament, legislation, and by the Government 
regulations and so on. Therefore, the content of local or enterprise level industrial 
relations was very limited (see details later). 
4.1.2.4. The main function of trade unions 
The main functions of a union section in an enterprise were a) to participate in 
the decision-making process so as to determine company strategy and policy; b) to 
regulate employment through collective bargaining; c) to fulfill welfare services, and d) 
to represent the interest of their members. 
In the enterprise the most important forum of decision-making was the so 
called „company-quartet". The quartet consisted of the director of the company, the 
secretary of the socialist party branch unit, the Young Communist League 4 ' and the 
representative of the trade union. The quartet had a weekly meeting, and all the 
important questions relating to the company were on its agenda. 
Beside this participation in the quartet, the Labor Code stipulated that in every 
question that might affect employment the management had to ask the opinion, or gain 
the assent of the trade union section before the decision was made. 
Collective bargaining was the main tool available to unions for regulating 
employment in conjunction with management. Although bargaining was compulsory, the 
regulatory scope of these agreements was fairly restricted. The terms and conditions of 
employment were set by legal regulation. Collective agreements were only 
complementary measures so as to accord with clauses of the Labor Code and various 
other laws and regulations. 
The trade union section played a substantial role in the distribution of social 
and other welfare benefits, organizing cultural entertainments, commemorations and 
holiday activities.42  There was a general opinion that the interest representing role of the 
trade union in the socialist regime was successful only in the field of social policy. In 
other areas, the company and plant level management represented their interests. The 
position taken by their immediate superior is decisive in terms of working conditions, 
wages, overtime, job security, the organization and rationalization of work and in the 
manpower transfer. 
One more additional function of the trade union was its role in the operation of 
the social security system. The law transferred to the trade union organization certain 
functions traditionally discharged by the State in the field of social security, and 
occupational safety and health protection. In these two fields the trade union functioned 
in much the same way as a state organ: it might set up administrative bodies, issue 
guide-lines, or gave instructions to the competent state authorities or enterprises; it also 
determined the level of individual pension and enterprise contributions to social 
insurance fund. It was able to impose sanctions when labor protection standards were 
41 The Young Communist League was the youth section of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. 
42 András Tóth, pp. 93-94. 
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violated. The central trade union organization's activities in this area were subject to the 
same kind of supervision, judicial in particular, as those of state bodies 4 3 The trade 
union's role in the social security administration was terminated in 1984. 44 
4.2. Initial development after 1988 
With the end of the socialist regime in Hungary one could expect the collapse of 
official unions and the revitalization of the grassroots Hungarian trade union movement. 
That did not happen. 
In the wake of the system-change there were substantial changes in the Hungarian 
trade union movement. First, a free „independent-of-the-past" grassroots trade union 
emerged at the beginning of 1988, and this was followed by the emergence of numerous 
other workplace level organizations. Two important new confederations were formed: 
the League of Independent Trade Unions in 1988, and the Workers' Council Movement 
in 1989. In 1990 the influence of these new organizations, and their number of member 
organizations rapidly increased. 
Second, the former party-controlled monopolistic National Council of Trade 
Unions (SZOT) fragmented. Since the beginning of 1990 SZOT under the new title of 
National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ) has split into four 
confederations and their 19 industrial branch unions into several occupational unions. 
Numerous trade union sections withdrew from the SZOT and its branch unions and 
proclaimed themselves independent. The organizational transformation of the former 
union structure was accompanied by a substantial fall in membership. 
This led to two types of pluralism emerging. First, a competitive pluralism came 
into being, both on national and workplace level, between the newly founded grassroots 
unions and old unions. 
At the national level there was a clear distinction between the old and the new 
confederations regarding their connection to the socialist past, their attitudes towards the 
transition, and their relationships towards political parties and economic problems such 
as privatization. This rivalry was strengthened and envenomed from late 1990 by the 
growing debate over the SZOT's assets. Meanwhile, at the workplace level, almost all 
the new unions were established as counter-unions against the existing old ones; their 
aim was to pursue different policies and different forms and content of interest 
representation. 
The competitive pluralism was accompanied, secondly, by a complementary 
pluralism between the four successor confederations of the SZOT. SZOT's former 19 
branch unions grouped themselves into four confederations: one for public service 
employees, one for the civil service employees, one for manufacturing and transport 
employees and one for chemical employees. The four confederations have distinct 
spheres of activity. In addition they have preserved their monopolistic industrial 
structure in their respective organizational areas. 
43 The trade union situation and industrial relations in Hungary, ILO, 1984 p. 26. 
44 Presidential Council Regulation No. 5 of 1984. 
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In 1989-90 the new confederations played an active political role and enjoyed a 
substantial political influence. The old unions were thrust into the background and were 
afflicted by a severe crisis of legitimacy owing to the burden of their past. 
From the beginning of 1991, it became clear that the new grassroots movements 
would be unable to achieve a breakthrough in their organizational drive. In most 
workplaces the workers, even though they withdrew from the old union, did not 
necessarily form a new one. The membership of the new confederations remained low, 
and their member organizations remained scattered, weakening the overall structure. The 
organizational drive that they mounted around 1991 began to slow down. The legal 
regulation of the new Labor Code (1992) concerning trade union rights had the effect of 
preventing several existing new unions from exercising their rights and of hindering the 
future growth of the new confederations. At the same time the new confederations were 
sliding towards the political margin. The old unions' presence in the workplace has 
largely persisted and stabilized. The legal regulation concerning trade union rights was 
to secure the old unions' monopoly in the workplace. The fragmentation of their 
structure stopped. On the political level, as the economic crisis deepened, it could be 
seen that a political revival of the old unions was taking place. 
Trade unions are currently perceived as weak and divided, and their credibility 
has also been impaired by the socialist legacy. 
As the shape of post-communist industrial relations unfolds, it becomes more and 
more obvious that a grassroots revitalization of the trade union movement has been 
removed from the social agenda and that the trade unions of the past have successfully 
survived the system change and retained their organizational dominance. 45 
4.3. The Japanese enterprise-based labor unions 
The next basic content of the Japanese industrial relations system is the enterprise 
union system. Some basic information about the Japanese trade unions see Table 14, 15. 
The social foundation of enterprise unions is the lifetime employment. Even 
before World War II the years a worker served in the same company had generally 
tended to increase and lifetime employment had become a current practice especially in 
large enterprises and this phenomenon resulted that there hardly existed an active labor 
market covering individual crafts and trades, hence, the working conditions were 
determined separately in each company. Furthermore, another influencing factor was the 
existence of Sangyo-hokokukai (Patriotic Industrial Association for Service to the State) 
which had been established in each enterprise during the war. Another stimulation was 
the lack of any other kind of organization able to cope effectively with the difficult 
problems of confronting workers after the war. In these circumstances workers quite 
naturally opted foi the idea of enterprise union. 46 
After World War II, in response to the demand for a more democratic and non-
discriminatory approach to personnel management, differences in the respective status 
of white-collar and blue-collar workers were eliminated. Thus enterprise unions were 
organized as unions covering all employees, including white-collars. They emphasized 
45 András Tóth, pp. 85-86. 
46 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 55-56. 
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distributive democracy, and consequently wage differentials between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers were considerably narrowed. 
The majority of Japanese labor unions are organized by enterprise (so called 
enterprise unions). In accordance with the Japanese concept of fellowship among all 
workers belonging to an enterprise, unions were created on an enterprise basis. These 
enterprise unions are, nevertheless, affiliate to industrial federations, and many of them 
belong in turn to one or another trade union national center. 
More than 90 % of all labor unions are enterprise-wide unions. There is only one 
industrial union, called Kaiinkumiai (All Japan Seamen's Union). Some general unions 
are also organized, called „Godorso" (Unified union). The Godorso organizes workers 
in a certain district irrespective of job and working place. 
The features of enterprise unions: a) the leaders of the union are employees of the 
enterprise and b) it is they who bargain with their management, c) while the parent 
company's union may have some say in determining working conditions, the right to 
make decisions ultimately rests with the local union, d) they collect their own dues, 
retain the greater part for their own use and pass on only a small percentage of them to 
the higher-echelon organization. 47 
In the Western countries most labor unions are craft unions, industrial unions or 
general unions, organized beyond the framework of the company, and covering the 
whole industry or occupational type. In these labor unions organized by members from 
different companies, labor vs. management opposition is strong. With trade unions, the 
ties between labor and management are intrinsically more distant than in enterprise 
unions where all members belong to the same firm. 
Moreover, it can be true that the enterprise union cooperates happily and 
voluntarily with management. However, many of rational observers must realize that the 
unions have very limited influence. For example, an often quoted trend is that the role of 
collective bargaining will be replaced by the management-union joint consultation 
system. On the one hand this is a very remarkable quiet solution. Because of the joint 
consultation voluntary institution it has not legal and binding effect. In that sense it is 
weakening the trade union rights. On the other hand, if this consultation is successful, it 
can avoid many unnecessary collective actions taken by both parties. 
However, Hirosuke Kawanishi sais: The enterprise unions in key industries do 
not play an effective role in tackling members' problems such as wages, working 
conditions, and shortening of working hours. Nor do they implement internal 
democracy. Rather they function as an auxiliary to management in the personnel sector. 
4.3.1. Multiple Labor Unions in Establishment 
Although in Japan there are exception, from enterprise unionism, (i.e. Japan 
Airlines, Japan Railways etc.) in which companies have several rival unions (union 
pluralism), in most cases at large enterprises there is only one union per enterprise. The 
union pluralism is allowed by the Constitution, as a basic right to organize. A clear 
distinction has to be made between plural union system and the enterprise inside union 
structure. The latter one is, when there is more than one union establishment in an 
47 Mikio Sumiya, p. 54. 
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enterprise, usually a unit (plant) union at each establishment, but even in these cases 
there is a central federal body, at the head enterprise, which has considerable integrating 
power. Collective bargaining and strike rights are concentrated at the central level, and 
wages, working hours and other basic working conditions are the same throughout the 
company. This structure can't be regarded as a plural union. 48 
There are multiple unions in about 10 % of all unionized enterprises. The 
existence of multiple unions is due to the difference of ideological or political opinions. 
The Labor Unions Act does not make provisions for multiple labor unions (trade union 
plurality). Therefore, there are some difficult problems to be addressed with multiple 
labor unions. 
For example, there is no representative system for collective bargaining. 
Consequently, every labor union has the right to bargain, since the Labor Unions Act 
does not provide an exclusive bargaining representative system. Therefore, each labor 
union can engage in collective bargaining for their members, in spite of the number of 
members. The employer can't refuse to bargain with a minority union because it is 
minority union. The Labor Unions Act requires the employer to treat all labor unions 
equally. This obligation is called the „neutral obligation of the employer in the rival 
union situation". 
4.3.2. Legal framework 
In Japan, there is no registration system for labor unions. Under the Labor 
Unions Act, there are two types of labor unions. One is a labor union without 
independence from the employer. The other is a qualified labor union. The following 
conditions characterize every labor union: 
workers at the supervisory post must be excluded from membership of the 
union; 	 . 
financial support shall not be received from the employer in defraying 
operational expenditures of the union; 
its objectives are not confined solely to mutual aid work or other welfare work; 
its main aim does not include carrying on a political movement. 
A labor union which satisfies the additional requirements outlined below is 
afforded further protection by the Labor Union Act and acquires the status of being a 
qualified union: 
members of the union, unless it is a federated one, shall have the right to 
participate in all union affairs and the right to equal treatment; 
no one shall be refused membership of the union because of race, religion, sex 
social status or family origin; 
the officers of the union shall be elected by direct secret ballot of the members. 
The officers of federations or national unions shall be elected by direct secret ballot of 
the delegates elected by secret ballot of the members; 
a general meetings shall be held at last once a year; 
the union's audited financial report is to be made public to the members at 
least once a year; 
48 Takeshi Inigami: Japanese Workplace Industrial Relations, Japan Institute of Labour, 1988 p. 23. 
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no strike action may be started without the agreement of the majority of the 
members in a direct secret ballot, in the case of a federation or national union, of the 
delegates elected by a direct secret ballot of all the members; 
no constitution shall be revised without the agreement of the majority of the 
members in a direct secret ballot or, in the case of a federation or national union, of the 
delegates elected by a direct secret ballot of all the members. 
These requirements demand that the labor union treats all of its members equally 
and that they shall be administered in a democratic fashion. 
4.3.3. Unionization practice and union shop agreement 
The issue of who may be a union member or not is set out in individual company 
labor agreements. Most agreements stipulate that unlike regular employees, those the 
position of section manager (kacho) or above are excluded from union membership. Of 
non-managerial employees, those in a probationary period, and those in personnel and 
secretarial departments or sections are also often excluded. However, very few non-
regular employees are organized as yet:" 
70.7 % of all labor agreements included a union shop clause stipulating that an 
eligible employee who did not join a union would be dismissed either in practice or in 
principle, in 1986.5° According to the principle of union pluralism, the union shop 
clause does not mean that every employee have to join the same unions. However, in the 
certain company only one union exists (and this is the majority), they have no other 
chance than enter into the union or loose his/her job, which is a very big disadvantage in 
the Japanese life-time and seniority based system. 
The union shop agreement is against the Hungarian Labor Code. The Article 15, 
based on the ILO Convention 87 on Coalition freedom, says: „It is the right of 
employees and employers to form (positive freedom of coalition), in accordance with 
conditions specified by a separate law, together with others, without any form of 
discrimination whatsoever, an organization that represents their interests and is directed 
towards the promotion of their economic and social interests; to join an organization of 
their choice, depending exclusively on the regulations of the given organization or to 
avoid (negative freedom of coalition) such organizations. Therefore, the union shop 
clause violates the law. 
4.3.4. Collective bargaining 
Collective bargaining committees in Japan are set up at the company level or 
establishment level. Collective bargaining is not carried out at the industrial level, 
although joint consultation may be. Moreover, bargaining participants are restricted to 
those within the company, without outside officials from either employees associations 
or unions.51 
49 Takeshi Inigami, p. 23. 
5o Takeshi Inigami, p. 23. 
51 Takeshi Inigami, p. 23. 
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4.3.5. Unfair labor practice 
The Japanese unfair labor practice has two specialty: one is that it has legal 
foundations in the Constitution. Another is that it prohibits employers' practices from 
infringing employees' rights. There is no unfair labor practice on the part of workers or 
employees. Another difference is that the Labor Relations Commissions are composed 
of laborers, employers and public interest, which generally means scholars and 
academics. Another is that judiciary relief by the courts is available to protect union 
activities from employers. As a result, the Commission's procedures become closer to 
court procedure. Therefore, it can't provide quick relief to labor unions and their 
members. 
The Labor Unions Act prohibits four types of unfair labor practices: 
discriminatory treatment of employees due to their participation in legal union 
activities; 
yellow dog contract; 
refusal to bargain collectively without good reason; 
control over or interference in the organization or management of labor 
unions. 
5. The basic features of wages and the wage negotiations system 
5.1. Wages and salaries 
One of the striking characteristics of Japan's wage system is the lack of sharp 
distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers' salary. Both are paid in the 
form of a monthly salary. (see Table 16) Another speciality is that Japanese wages are 
composed of a basic wage and various kinds of allowances, including housing 
allowances, family allowances, commuting allowances, overtime allowances and 
retirement allowances. Bonuses are also part of a typical remuneration package. 
Contrary to this, in Hungary there are usually, significant differences between the 
wages and salaries of blue- and white collar workers, even if they belong to the same age 
bracket. In most cases the wage depends on the individual performance and the 
educational background. 
Another difference is that the wage-bonus-allowance system does not exist 
systematically together. The wage is the employers' responsibility. The bonus system is 
usually unknown in Hungary, and recently the allowance system almost entirely belongs 
to the local or central government. 
The basic wage is determined in consideration of the workers' age, length of 
service, education background and job-performing abilities. In this system, wages 
automatically increase every year. 
In Hungary there is no wage increase automatism in the private sector either. 
However, it existed during the socialist period. 
However, in Japan the amount of increase is different for each worker, owing to 
his performance evaluation. When the evaluation is better, wages are increased higher. 
Bonuses are usually paid twice each year, in addition to the monthly salary. The bonus 
amount is typically equivalent to one-third or one-quarter of the annual salary. The 
28 
amount of bonus is also decided according to the employee's personnel evaluation. This 
system introduces an element of competition amongst workers and is an important factor 
contributing to the relatively high productivity in Japanese industry. 
Enterprises in Japan do not purchase only manpower from workers, but employ 
workers as person. In that sense, in the so called job-oriented wage (Western model), the 
wage rate is an important issue for the enterprise as well as for workers, while in the 
case of the personalistic (Japanese model) wage, the issue is the life of workers, to 
which the enterprise can't be indifferent. Lengths of experience and service regulate the 
wage, and the age of workers has been another important factor in wage decisions.(see 
Table 17) This consideration is closely related to the idea of the living wage. According 
to this wage system, if a worker marries, has a child or more, and becomes older, living 
costs increase. The personalistic wage, in particular, the Japanese seniority-based wage, 
just fits these events in the life of the worker. 52 
The widespread existence of employment related allowances is a specific feature 
of Japanese industrial relations but not customary in Europe and the US. These 
allocations are mostly the commutation allowance and the family allowance. The 
commutation allowance is rather personalistic, since its amount depends on the location 
of the worker's residence. Personalism is more pronounced in the case of family 
allowance, since it has nothing to do with the amount and quality of work offered to the 
employer. The family allowance is therefore incorporated in the social security system 
but not in the employment relations in Westerns countries. 53 The exception in the case 
of Japan stems from the fact that enterprises do not contract for the manpower of 
workers, but employ workers considering their whole life situations, and pay family 
allowance as a measure of this consideration. In this sense, the family allowance is a 
typical characteristic of the personalism employment system in Japan. 54 We remark that 
during socialism the family allowance was an employment-related benefit. For long 
period only those workers were eligible for family allowance who had employment 
relations for a certain period. 
5.2. Minimum wage (regional minimum wage) 
In Japan there are two ways to determine the minimum wage under the Minimum 
Wages Act of 1959. One is the determination by the Labor Minister or the Chief of the 
Prefectural Labor Standards Bureau at the request of all employers and labor unions 
covered by a collective agreement which applies to the majority of workers of the same 
kind and their employers in a certain district. 
52 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 134-135. 
53 In Hungary during the socialist period the family allowance was an employment related benefit. 
The answer why it was employment related lies in the socialist principle of full employment. According to 
this thought, if everybody works in state-owned companies and the family allowance based on employment 
relations means that almost the entire family could get family allowance. However, the scope of employment 
relations widened continuously, for example several types of private corporations and enterprises emerged, 
the number of part time and irregular workers has increased and so on, and therefore the employment-related 
family allowance system has been replaced by the universal system. Consequently, every family with a 
certain number of kids was eligible for family allowance. 
54 Mikio Sumiya, p. 134-135. 
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Another is the decision set up by the Labor Minister or the Chief of the 
Prefectural Labor Standards Bureau, based on a preliminary research and study of the 
Minimum Wages Council, which is a tripartite body composed of representatives of 
public, labor and management interests. Almost all minimum wages are determined by 
this latter method. The meeting of the Prefectural Minimum Wages Council is opened 
upon the proposal of labor or management to amend minimum wages (see Table 18). 
Minimum wages are set by each Chief of Prefectural Labor Standards Bureau in 
the form of regional minimum wages. The minimum wages may be comprehensively 
applicable to all workers in the prefecture regardless of industry or occupation. Industry-
wide minimum wages applicable to workers in a specified industry may also be 
established. In other words, there is no minimum wage applicable uniformly to all 
workers in Japan. Minimum wages are not applied to the following employees under the 
permission of the Chief of the Prefectural Labor Standards Bureau: 
those who have a very low ability to work, due to psychical or mental 
handicap; 
employees during their probationary period; 
employees on certified vocational training; 
employees whose working hours are very short; 
employees engaged in light work 
employees engaged in intermittent labor. 
Since 1978, the Central Minimum Wages Council has classified all 47 
prefectures into four ranks and proposed a guideline for the regional minimum wages to 
the Prefectural Minimum Wages Council in order to ensure the consistency of regional 
minimum wages on a nationwide basis. The Prefectural Minimum Wages Council 
usually determines the regional minimum wages based on the guideline. Employers 
failing to comply can be fined up to a total , of 10.000 yen. 
In Hungary there is also some kind of pluralism within setting up the calculation 
of minimum wage. It means that there is 'an official minimum wage decided by tripartite 
NCRI (see later), which is regulated in every year by the Government. Beside this 
official minimum wage figures there are several so called unofficial minimum wage 
calculations and requirements elaborated by various social groups and organizations, 
such as the Újpesti Family Help Center, and so on. 
5.3. Yearly wage negotiation or Shunto 
The method of wage negotiations at industry level (shunto) was introduced by the 
unions as tactics designed to overcome the difficulties of enterprise-level bargaining. 
(see Table 19) Under this method, the parent industrial union analyzes the overall 
situation of the industry and unifies the wage demands of its affiliated unions. However, 
the enterprise unions will bargain separately within each enterprise. If they fail to reach 
their demands they can jointly and simultaneously go on strike. It means, they can thus 
equalize the impact of the strike on competing enterprises and also obtain similar rates 
of wage increase, with the resulting labor costs to each enterprise also being equalized. 55 
55 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 59-61. 
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5.4. Some words about the changed wage system in Hungary 
The former strict wage tariffs were diluted. Central control was made to operate 
on the total wage outflow of each company and not on the wage of an individual worker. 
This company-related average wage system gave each company the possibility of 
building up its own internal labor market and paying workers on the basis of their value 
to the company's interest.56 Therefore, the Shunto-type centralized wage negotiation 
system does not exist recently. However, in the socialist regime the wage system 
controlled and decided by the state. (see Table 20) 
6. Total quality management 
6.1. The main characteristics of Japanese Total Quality Control (TQM) system 
The total quality control (TQM) or „kaizen" is a continuous improvement in the 
company, based on the re-organization of the social component of the factories. 
The key element of TQM is to increase the social and work responsibility for the 
operators and every employees the company. One effect of this system is that inspectors 
and machine repairers are now virtually non-existent, only the employees in charge 
control the given work done by them. Consequently, the workers in this system are more 
content, enjoy job satisfaction and allegiance to the company. This method has produced 
an equalizing process in the workplace as well. 
With the operator's increased power and control over their work, eliminating the 
need for supervisors, this kind of antagonism and potential for conflict was removed, 
thus creating a far more harmonious working environment. 
The actual operators gained a store of first-hand knowledge of common 
problems, and also how to solve them. There is no total quality depártment, nor a group 
of managers who are given the task of creating or implementing total quality control. 
Rather, total quality control is built into the system. 57 
The total quality management system includes: a) the suggestion system; b) 
holding quality circles; c) emphasizing customers satisfaction; d) consulting in a 
determined manner those who operated the machines; e) obtaining feedback and f) 
working on eliminating the problem rather than solving them after they occur. All these 
features are an integral part of the Japanese big firms.58 We have already dealt with 
some of the above mentioned main characteristics, therefore here we are concentrating 
only on the remaining ones. 
6.1.1. Customer satisfaction 
Another area in which the Japanese attempt to implement the total quality 
approach concerns customer satisfaction. Almost all the innovations and discussion 
56 András Tóth, p. 95. 
57 Ruth Taplin, pp. 66-67. 
58 Ruth Taplin, p. 64. 
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among employees in Japanese companies in terms of continuous improvement, service 
and planning are oriented towards customer satisfaction, as well as creating an overall 
framework for the improvement of both product and service. This emphasis on customer 
satisfaction is linked to the idea of gaining market share rather than immediate short-
term profit, and goes back to the basic assumption that the long term is more important 
than the short term. However, a satisfied customer will buy more of the products, which 
naturally strengthens the company in the long term. 
The ideas often practiced by Japanese companies in relation to Total Quality 
Management centered on customer satisfaction. They included training on the job, ideas 
of continuous improvement, ceasing dependence on supervisor and inspectors to achieve 
quality products and using many suppliers rather than a single one. The latter practice 
avoids awarding work to suppliers who only offer the cheapest price rather than a good 
quality product or service. 
The systematic approach to total quality control adopted by the Japanese also 
avoided the Western tendency to compartmentalize every aspect of the company and 
there were certainly no quality-control departments or quality-control people who were 
only in charge of trying to institute quality. Everyone as part of the total quality drives to 
improve production, services and customer satisfaction to the highest standards 
possible. 59 
6.2. Job rotation system 
Another important feature is the job rotation system. Almost everyone has 
worked at some point in other people's jobs which aids the decision-making process, 
„uchiawase". The job rotation is an immanent precondition of the horizontal-based 
decision-making process which allows everyone to discuss across and through different 
departments how they think a decision should be implemented. This can only be 
accomplished because people have had both intra- and extra-departmental experience of 
each other's jobs. No manager in the Japanese context does simply graduate and is 
placed in a top managerial position a couple of years later. Managers are required to 
start at the bottom, working their way through obedience to company rules and the aging 
process up the promotional ladder.6o 
6.3. Just in time system 
This process takes a great deal of logistical understanding between suppliers and 
the plant. The main advantages of the "just in time" system are: a) increases the 
productivity and the quality; b) saves processing time; c) saves space (limited warehouse 
needed). 
This can only be done if there is some kind of systematic approach that links all 
the different facets of the production process together to make a steady flow analysis 
rather than an unrelated productive part analysis. 
60 Ruth Taplin, pp. 67-68. 
59 Ruth Taplin, pp. 91-92. 
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If no systematic approach was followed, a lapse in communication would occur 
between the ending part of the process and the beginning part of it, making it 
unsuccessful. In other words, if there is no systematic flow analysis and no proper 
assessment of the logistics needed to understand how this flow would work throughout 
the system, it can't work. Without this prerequisition the just in time system can not 
work, only create disruption in the company. 
Many times, numerous Western companies simply do not have enough 
knowledge on a holistic basis of what actually happens in their companies. In addition, 
the systematic approach is difficult to implement in Western countries, because the 
tradition of the Western companies does not create a completely self-sufficient structure 
that includes banks, administration, manufacturers, suppliers and trading companies 
under one company complex, like „Zaibatsu" and the new „Sogo Shosha/Keiretsu". 61 
7. Dual labor market practice 
The dual labor market is a Japanese phenomenon. It means that simultaneously 
two labor market, an internal and an external, exist. The internal labor market strongly 
connotes to the life-employment practice and to the employment security policy. Internal 
labor markets are developed at the highly industrialized stage where specific jobs are 
specialized at large industrial plants. The external labor market has emerged with the 
enhancement of irregular works, like part-time work, dispatched work and so on. And it 
is also immanently connected to some special groups of labor market members, like 
female employees, students etc (see Table 21,22). 
In the internal labor market the job-and-wage rate is not directly subject to 
demand and supply on the labor market but is directly conditioned by determinants 
within a firm such as the employer's administrative policy, union activities and the 
custom of the enterprise community. In this system the firms recruit directly from the 
labor market only once a year, which in general means high school or university 
graduates, to fill their vacant jobs. In many other cases the firm replaces the worker from 
within into the required work. The new employment occurs only to fill the bottom of the 
ladder of promotion in the internal labor market. With such a market relationship 
established, seniority is given a great significance. The more consideration workers pay 
to their future promotion and security in employment, the less their turn-over will be, 
and the longer duration of their continued service will óe. 62 
The Europeans are not interested in the internal labor markets or seniority 
system. Because the rights of workers secured at workplaces under the craft union 
system have remained with no substantial change in Great Britain and as well as in 
Hungary, the neoclassical model of labor markets is as yet adequate to a considerable 
extent, thus forestalling the possibility of developing seniority-based relations at 
enterprise labor markets. 63 
Furthermore, in the United States the same point, in connection with the 
lengthening of continued service at a single firm, has been discussed as new feudalism in 
industrial relations. 
62 Mikio Sumiya, p. 91. 
63 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 101-102. 
61 Ruth Taplin, pp. 68-69. 
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8. Unemployment 
In Hungary a serious factor has been the rapid growth of unemployment, and the 
need to establish an appropriate safety net including unemployment benefit (see Table 
23). 
8.1. Employment and unemployment trends 
The sharp rise in open unemployment was a predictable result of the transition to 
a market economy. Under the centrally planned economy, there had been significant 
labor hoarding in the large state enterprises to address the recurrent problems of labor 
shortage. It was widely accepted that significant lay-offs would now have to occur in 
order to increase productivity levels and make Hungarian private industry reasonably 
competitive in an open market economy. 
Under the World Bank's assessment, significant unemployment from releasing 
redundant labor and/or downward wage flexibility will be necessary to improve labor 
productivity in the state sector; and stabilization and structural adjustment are likely to 
lead to high short-term unemployment rates. Surplus labor can be released with 
minimum hardship only if the Government pursues an active employment policy within 
a market framework. This is seen to involve a) improving the institutional infrastructure 
and functioning of the labor market (wage determination, employment and training 
services, labor market information etc.); and b) improving the labor supply side, by 
restructuring vocational training for youth and adults, and reforming higher education. 
Rigidities in the supply and demand of labor are seen equally serious. Unless rapidly 
addressed, rigid labor markets together with an " unresponsive training system will 
severely constrain the economic reforms and the move to a market economy (see Table 
24; 25). 
The logic and the relationship of the employment market and the unemployment 
situation in Japan and in Europe and in USA is significantly different. In Japan, the 
implementation of employment security itself, within the internal labor market, is a 
guarantee to avoid bulk unemployment. This employment policy itself is a preventive 
method in order to lighten the burden of unemployment or in some sectors to avoid it. 
Contrary, the Hungarian Employment Law, Act IV of [991 on Employment Promotion 
and Provisions for the Unemployed enacted some significant endeavor in order to 
establish the so called active employment policy, which contains some institutions 
assisting potential or effective unemployed persons to stay or get back into the labor 
market. Unfortunately, these kind of active measures are not yet an immanent part of the 
Hungarian employment practice. We would say that the Japanese is a preventive and the 
Hungarian is an "extinguisher" type system. 
An ILO report found, for example that there has clearly been labor decreasing 
and a decline in total employment since 1989. Private sector employment doubled 
between 1989 and 1991 with the addition of some 350.000 new jobs during this two-
year period, but over this same period employment in the state sector fell by 519.000. 
Overall employment fell by 15 per cent in the first nine months of 1991 compared with 
the same period in 1990. Moreover registered unemployment grew fast in 1991, from 
around 100.000 at the beginning of the year to 406.000 in December, representing a rise 
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in the unemployment rate from 2.1 per cent to over 7.3 per cent. At the same time the 
average length of unemployment had been increasing, and the rate of unemployment was 
expected to continue to rise. It was found that the skill composition of the unemployed 
had been changing, with unskilled and semi-skilled workers now comprising over half of 
all job-seekers.64 
8.2. Employment policies and legislation 
The Employment Law, Act IV of 1991 on Employment Promotion and Provision 
for the Unemployed, was enacted in early 1991 and amended in 1992. It outline both 
broad principles of employment and training policies and the procedural aspects of their 
implementation. 
The law establishes rules on lay-offs, placing certain restrictions on employers' 
rights to terminate employment. For example, if an employer wants to reduce the 
number of employees by at least 25 per cent within a month it shall announce the 
decision with the statement of the reasons three months prior to ordinary notice. 
Workplace committees including workers' representatives are to determine the 
principles and phasing of lay-offs, and to determine workers' benefits in addition to 
those required by law. 65 
8.3. Issues in employment policy 
As unemployment rises, the main issues of debate have been the relative priority 
given to active and passive employment policies, and the means by which employment 
measures can or should be financed. The actual extent of the measures provided by the 
Employment Law depends very much on the state budgetary allocations. 
The recent employment policy responses have been reviewed by the ILO. An 
ILO mission observed generally that very little appeared to have been done by way of 
policies to influence the level of employment creation in the design of overall transition 
policies. Also very little appeared to have been done to analyze the effects of changes in 
taxation, methods of funding social benefits, and various aspects of labor market 
regulation on the creation of employment. 
Concerns have been widely expressed that passive measures are absorbing too 
much money, leading to severe budgetary pressures. Labor Ministry officials have 
stressed that the main emphasis at the present time must be on passive measures, 
because only one quarter of the unemployed can be reached through an active labor 
policy. But in 1992 the Ministry's requests for a substantial increase in the budget for 
passive measures were rejected both by the Ministry of Finance and the social partners 
themselves during tripartite negotiations. 66 
65 Roger Plant, pp. 145-146. 
64 Roger Plant, pp. 143-144. 
66 Roger Plant, p. 146. 
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8.4. Unemployment 
The traditional Japanese solution to deal with redundant employees, within the 
internal labor market, is shifting them to subsidiaries or smaller client companies, that is 
why unemployment rate is very low in Japan (see Table 26). However, this solution, 
because of the recessions and keener competition in the international market, will not be 
sufficient or is getting more difficult.ó7 It appears that while there have been massive 
redundancies over the last couple of years, and more are projected, some firms have 
come up with interesting ways to avoid enforced „early retirement". This includes, 
providing workers with two days off per month and extending the Golden week holidays 
— all in the name of cutting costs. 
No doubt there is also a strong correlation between the maintenance of the 
existing workforce and the government incentives to do so. For example, the 
employment support subsidies by the Ministry of Labor alone was 38.4 billion Yen in 
1994. 
Consequently, downsizing in Japan is different from the US for it usually does 
not affect the „core group of employees". Part-time employees and subcontractors are 
hit the hardest when Japanese companies downsize. Because these employees are 
considered as being „outside" of the core group they are expendable. 
8.5. Some criticism of the Japanese way of unemployment rate calculation 
To recalculate the Japanese unemployment rate the following calculation was 
made by Japan's Management and Coordination Agency (see details in Kishi Nobuhito's 
article in Japan Echo, Autumn 1995, p. 38) it adds to the conventional unemployment 
rate an estimate of part time workers who would prefer to work full time, and an 
allowance for „discouraged" workers who have given up actively seeking a job but who 
would willingly work if employment was available, and who are excluded from the 
Japanese employment figures, for example housewives, etc. On this basis the 
unemployment rate for Japan in 1994 was 8.9 %, compared with 8.8 % for the US. 
Moreover, this calculation does not pay attention to numerous under-employed workers 
who are still retained by companies under the Life-Time Employment System. 
9. An emerging new phenomenon: female employment and irregular work 
9.1. Increasing Female participation in the labor market 
Another major problem in Japanese labor relations is female employment (see 
Table 27,28). The most heated issue is the equality of working conditions between male 
and female. Recently the Equal Employment Opportunity Act has regulated this 
problem. 
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The labor force participation rate of female workers in Japan is high from the age 
of 18, when they normally graduate from school, to the age of 25 when they usually get 
married. Then, it decreases between the ages of 26 and 35, when women usually bear 
and raise children. It goes up again after age 35, when they can spare the time they had 
devoted to rearing their children again. 
Nonetheless, in Japan where lifetime employment is prevalent, the middle-aged 
female workers can find employment as parttimer. The majority welcome part-time jobs 
where working hours are fairly loosely set, which helps them make holding a job 
compatible with their household and family responsibilities. This is also the area, 
however, where poor working conditions prevail and adversely affect the entire female 
labor. Of course, this kind of employment falls outside the control, of not only of labor 
unions but also of statutes governing equal employment of man and woman.ó 8 
9.2. The role of part-time work in the Japanese labor practice 
Being a part-time employee in Japan (see Table 29) is different from being part-
timers in the US If you are a part-time employee in Japan you work full-time but do not 
get the same rights and/or benefits as those who are hired as full-time employees. 
Women are more likely to be hired on a part-time basis than they are to be hired on a 
full-time basis. Also it is relatively easy to fire a part-time employee if business is bad. 
Japanese companies generally make much more use of sub-contractors than American 
companies. For companies which use „on demand" or „just in time" production systems 
- it is relatively easy to cut back on production when demand is weak. The use of sub-
contractors is a way for corporations to keep the number of „core" employees small. 
Thus when times are bad the sub-contractors bear the losses not the large corporations. 
In addition to the in/out group system there is also a social class element in that 
the members of the out (expendable) group are usually from a lower social class than are 
the members of the in „core" group. 
9.3. Some features of part-time employment in the socialist area 
In Hungary, workers and employees generally worked full time. The number and 
proportion of employees in part-time jobs were very small; it was only 52.000 in 1985. 
However, the 320.000 pensioners who work part-time must also be added that. 
The composition of registered part-timers was similar to that in other countries. 
Four-fifths of them are women and three-fourths work in the tertiary sector. 
The quantitative and qualitative features of part-time employment were explained 
primarily by the specific socio-political and politico-economic objectives engendered by 
the „socialist" model of socio-economic development. From the outset, a prominent aim 
of our social and employment policy has been to strengthen the social equality of women 
with the basic precondition that they are involved in income-generating activities. This 
socio-political objective coincided with an economic policy oriented towards the 
acceleration of economic growth through the „full" employment of available labor 
68 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 66-67. 
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resources. The demand for part-time employment emerged only to a limited extent, with 
a few exceptions, and young female job-seekers wanted full-time employment. This 
policy orientation was strengthened by the fact that, owing to the very low level of real 
earnings in the 50s, families sought to achieve the highest possible incomes. The 
economic activity of women increased rapidly from the 50s onwards, and by the end of 
60s it had almost reached the activity rate for men. Social policy assumed that the social 
institutions for educating children, state and company nurseries, kindergartens and 
organized day-time occupation at schools would be able to relieve women of a great part 
of the work related to child rearing. 
In fact, the mechanization of households and the development of child care and 
support services could provide only partial assistance with regard to the raising of 
children. Hence, it was primarily for reasons of family support and demographic policy 
that the expansion of part-time employment grew in Hungary in the 70s, in the hope that 
it would ease the tension between full-employment and household duties. 
The established circumstances greatly aggravate diffusion of part-time 
employment, given the scarcity of labor, enterprises provided part-time employment 
only exceptionally. In addition, the cost-sensitivity of enterprises was not strong enough 
to enable them to expand employment forms in response to the cyclical fluctuations of 
labor demand and diminish wage cost. Employees experienced even greater difficulties. 
9.4. The recent problem of flexible working hours 
As already mentioned earlier, the working time of full-time employees in the 
various sectors of economic activity has been laid down in the Labor Code. However, 
the evolution of working-time patterns which governs the framework of the utilization of 
working-time came under the authority of the enterprises in 1968. But the employers' 
independence in that area did not extend to the application of flexible working time until 
1980. The permission of the employer's supervisory organ was needed for its 
introduction between 1966 and 1980. 
The first experiments with new flexible working-time systems began in Hungary 
in 1972. Since then, such systems have been chosen by the enterprises and institutions in 
which the daily starting and finishing times and the length of the working day can be 
chosen by employees themselves, with greater or lesser freedom. 
The problem of the „trade-off" between the reduction and flexibilisation of the 
working time has emerged in Hungary only in one respect: namely in such a way that 
labor administration regarded flexible working time as a means of implementing the 
working-time reductions of the early 80s, which would prevent a situation in which the 
reduction of v)orking time would result in a reduction of the opening hours of 
enterprises, business establishment and services. 
The labor administration makes every effort to propagate flexible working time 
for demographic policy considerations, in the interest of a more harmonious relationship 
between employees, and their family obligations, to improve the efficiency of 
employment and to make the adjustment to a production system without a fixed-time 
pattern easier as well as to reduce working-time losses such as absenteeism. 
So far, the trade unions have not taken a stand for or against the practical 
application of flexible working-time measures at the enterprise level. But the public 
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pronouncements of union leaders favor its large-scale application on the basis of 
arguments similar to those used by the labor administration. 
While no data is available on the types of employees affected by flexible working 
time in enterprises of different sizes, it is known that, in 1985, six per cent of all full-
time manpower of the „socialist" sector worked flexible hours, nine-tenths of these were 
white-collar workers. 
Consequently, the percentage of blue-collar workers working flexible hours was 
only 2.1 per cent, while 14.1 per cent of white-collar workers did so. The latter are far 
more frequently found in the capital than in provincial towns, not to speak of rural areas. 
Employers use flexible working time to improve the management of working-
time and to stabilize their stock of employees. 
Employees see the advantages of flexible working time as being, firstly, the 
harmonization of family life and working life; the easier reconciliation of family-related 
chores, taking young children to kindergarten and day-time occupations and of coming 
to work on time; the avoidance of the rush hours and of being late for work; and the 
possibility of an easier co-ordination of private affairs and work. 
The wider application of flexible working-time patterns is impeded by the fact 
that under the prevailing labor market relations a significant proportion of employees 
have found it possible to individualize the formerly rigid rules. The general looseness of 
the labor discipline gives ample opportunity for an arbitrary shortening of working time 
and for its adaptation to individual demands, thereby replacing the lack of a valid 
flexible working-time pattern.69 
New types of working-time patterns which increase the free choice of the 
employees (primarily the introduction of the formalized system of flexi-time), began in 
Hungary in the first half of the 70s. But by the early 80s it was only applied by a few 
enterprises and institutions. Estimates indicate that only 1.5 per cent of all employees 
were engaged under flexible working time arrangements. Since that time, government 
agencies, the trade press and the mass media mounted an intensive campaign for the 
introduction of flexible working-time patterns. As a result, in 1985, six per cent of all 
employees were already working flexi-time. 
The results of a survey revealed various types of working-time patterns in 
individual economic branches during the socialist period which are given in Table 30. 
10. Labor-Management Communication 
At the same time, there were important changes in the structure of worker 
representation at the enterprise level. As of the late 1970s, shop stewards began to 
assume a major role. As direct representatives of the trade union members, they had the 
right of joint decision on issues including collective agreements and enterprise wage 
policies, and were also consulted on matters related to production planning and 
organizational changes. A later innovation was the Enterprise Councils established in the 
state sector in the mid 1980s. Comprising of management and worker representatives in 
equal numbers, they had rights of decision over major economic issues related to 
69 Times are changing, working time in 14 industrialized countries, ed. Gerhard Bosch, Peter 
Dawkins and Francois Michon, International Institute for Labor Studies, Geneva, 1993, pp. 188-190. 
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production and planning, and also over the election and dismissal of the director of the 
enterprise. However, the Enterprise Council arrangement has often been depicted as an 
instrument of managerial control, which served to accelerate the demise of the trade 
union role in management decisions. 70 
10.1. Labor-management communication in Hungary 
10.1.1. Joint consultation in Japan 
Generally, joint consultation has supplanted collective bargaining as the most 
fundamental communication channel between management and labor. Almost everything 
related to the company is taken up and discussed there (see detailes Table 31). 
Companies hold the system in high regard, and both labor and management have 
channels to communicate the results to the employees (union members). In this sense, 
not only has joint consultation become the most fundamental institution of labor 
participation in Japan, but from the point of view of information sharing among group 
members, it has an extremely important function. 7 l 
The core medium for industrial relations within the Japanese company is often 
said to be joint consultation. A wide range of issues including management, production, 
working conditions, welfare and so on are discussed at regulate bodies, not just at the 
company level, but at the establishment level as well. Joint consultation bodies are not 
restricted to companies with unions, although at the no-union employers the proportion 
is lower. 
Unlike collective bargaining, the establishment of joint consultation bodies is not 
obligatory under the Trade Union Law. All have been established voluntarily. 
The basic subject-matters of joint consultation include basic management policy, 
plans for production and sales, company organization, the introduction of new 
machinery or equipment based on new technology, rationalization of production 
administration, etc. (management issues) as well as wages, bonuses, working hours, 
leave and absences, layoffs and dismissals, health and safety, etc. (basic working 
conditions), and training programs, welfare etc. 
It is notable that issues such as wages, bonuses, working hours, which have 
traditionally been dealt with through collective bargaining, are discussed, to a 
considerable extent. 
10.1.2. Production Councils 
Apart from joint consultation, there are company/establishment/workshop 
production committees which discuss quarterly, monthly and weekly production plans, 
including workloads, delivery dates, work allocation and overtime. 
Issues such as how many workers it will take to produce so much product within 
a certain time, how much overtime will be needed and whether this is within the 
70 Roger Plant, pp. 153-154. 
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overtime agreement, whether the workers are available and the feasibility of the 
production schedule are discussed at council meetings. At the workshop level the 
discussions are very concrete, and the necessary revisions are made through the 
council.72 
10.1.3. Workshop meetings 
An even more immediate form of participation for individual 'employees is 
workshop meetings at which employees and supervisors get together to discuss work at 
hand and workshop environment. This is more widespread than joint consultation 
bodies. Any matter relating to the workplace is discussed. 
The meetings are led by workshop supervisors. Not only are company plans 
communicated to the employees in these meetings, but the views of the employees are 
expressed and conveyed upwards. Hence, from the employees' point of view, workshop 
meetings are a very important opportunity for worker participation. 73 
10.1.4. Small-group Activities and Suggestion Schemes 
10.1.4.1. Small group activities or quality control circles 
Small-group activities or quality control circles (hinshitsu kanri) were introduced 
into Japan during the Allied Occupation and have remained until nowadays. 
The principles of statistical quality control are quite simple. They are based on 
the premise that inferior goods are produced because of variations in the production 
system. Quality control aims at eliminating the substandard products. To achieve this, it 
is necessary to understand the factors that produce variations and to stabilize them. This 
requires solving every problem in each stage of the designing, use of manufacturing 
equipment, materials, and work procedures. 
Since the solution of quality problems involves every aspect of the production 
system, the task is best accomplished by involving all members of the enterprise. In 
Japan, quality-control circles, or small work groups at various levels of the enterprise, 
have been utilized for this function. They were first organized in 1962 and quickly 
spread throughout the country. Members of these quality-control circles are trained to 
use several types of techniques of statistical analysis, which were originally designed for 
quality-control specialist in the US. 
Production level quality control must be backed up by the efforts of other 
departments, including market research, design, marketing, and after-sales service, in 
order to be effective. 
This concept of involving all members of the enterprise is referred to in Japan as 
the total quality control system. 
72 Takeshi Inigami, p. 26. 
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10.1.4.2. Quality control-rationalization-automation 
Introducing new automate production system, Japanese enterprises discovered 
that successful automatic operation depended on the drastic reduction of the rejection 
rate, or in other words, strict production rationalization. If production is automated 
without first reducing the rejection rate, the automated system will only result in 
producing a large number of inferior goods. 
The effective combination of automation, quality control and production 
rationalization has played an important role in helping Japanese industry raise its 
productivity. 
The topics of small-group activities are: quality improvements, rationalization of 
work procedures, safety and cost cutting, etc. 74 
10.1.4.3. Suggestion schemes 
Suggestion are submitted by both individuals and groups. Items include: a) 
improving the efficiency of manufacturing techniques; b) health and safety; development 
and sales of new products; c) welfare and education and training. The suggestions are 
gathered by the secretariat and are judged by a committee. 75 
Company workers are given monetary rewards, holidays and bonuses if they 
made suggestions that helped to improve productivity, save time and create greater 
customer satisfaction, thus making more profit for the company. 
Some of the companies, however, were so keen on suggestions that they even 
went as far as putting pressure on the workforce to make suggestions on a monumental 
scale, such as a thousand per worker per year. Such an approach invalidated the 
voluntary system, and superimposed instead an immense conformist pressure in order to 
improve productivity. 
The suggestion system reflects the Japanese view of people as the company's 
most important resource. They were acknowledged as the people who would know best 
from their own first-hand experience how they could make their products to a higher 
standard and more cost-effective. 76 
10.1.5. Self-appraisal system 
The self-appraisal system is one in which employees periodically write an 
evaluation of their abilities and performance, as well as what jobs they would like and 
where they would like to be doing them. The reported items were: desired site of work; 
desired job; self-ability regarding qualifications and skills etc. This system is widespread 
in larger firms. 
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10. Management strategies and behavior 
10.1. Market share rather than or beside profit share 
In a Japanese company it is perceived as a long-term goal, whereas for a Western 
company it is usually a short-term and in contemporary Hungary a very short-term goal. 
The Japanese tend to emphasize market share rather than profit per se. They see that 
building a market share will eventually lead to a stable secure market whereby they will 
have a secure long-term source of income. 
The Japanese feel that in the long term the market share will ensure a stable 
source of profit and revenue for goods. From their point of view it is better to produce 
goods that will make their company name a household word and known for years to 
come. The market share will then provide the stable base from which revenue can be 
drawn, ensuring longevity. 77 
In a Western company, as well as in a Hungarian one, profit maximization tends 
to be very short-term, concentrating on what profits may be gained at the present time. 
And in the West and in Hungary as well, human resources are not considered to be of 
prime importance and they are therefore something to be manipulated or marketed. The 
most important factors in the West are the monetary aspects (profit) and the products.78 
In the Japanese case, the results are the most important and that is what one will 
finally be judged by. In the Anglo-American world the most important criterion is how 
the game is played or how the results are achieved and although the results are of great 
importance, it is always the case that the end never really justifies the means. 79 
10.2. The employers'' long-term human resource policy 
From the Japanese perspective, people tend to be the most important resource. 
Human resources are indeed seen as the most important feature in the long-term success 
of the company. The large Sogo Shosha/Keiretsu attempt to be known for the quality of 
their products, their manufacturing expertise, or their market-share, or how efficient they 
are in satisfying customers, rather than as a brand name molded by public relations 
exercises. 
In contrary, in Western companies people as a human resource and market-share 
are seen to be of less importance. The most essential selling feature is the actual product 
presentation, how well it sells and how much profit it can bring to shareholders in the 
shortest term possible.80 
The Japanese employers also feel that because they have invested in these people 
by spending money on years of training, it is best to retain them. Then, when there is an 
upturn in the economy, it will be beneficial to have a prepared, willing, loyal, trained 
workforce who, with the minimum of extra training expenditure, are ready to put their 
utmost into their work and to make the most of the upturn. By the workforce means the 
77 Ruth Taplin, p. 42. 
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core, full-time employees. However, nowadays the number of the so-called peripheral 
staff, who are hired according to the dictates of supply and demand is increasing. 81 
From the point of view of the employer life-time employment has a double-sided 
feature. On the one hand, if the hired employee works well, this is a successful relation. 
If not, this causes a huge burden on the company, because it is very difficult to fire a 
full-time employee. Of course, there are several technics how to deal with the 
underperforming employees, however, this is a big disadvantage of this system. 
Underperformance does create a problem that is difficult for those practicing 
Total Quality Management to deal with. The Japanese approach to the problem is not to 
fire the person, but to warn him/her and then to try group pressure. The Japanese way is, 
not to fire people but to keep them on even if their performance is poor. 
The Japanese feel that if they are going to put money and effort into training 
people and carry them along through the company for many years it is probably much 
better for everyone to have to take a reduction in salary in the short term rather than fire 
employees. Once economic recovery occurs, then all the company members share in the 
benefits. Japanese managers believe that they have a ready-made trained loyal 
workforce. To fire them and then hire new people during an upturn means that they can't 
be sure of the loyalty or quality of the new employees. 82 
10.3. Decision-making process 
In Japan, with the process of "nemawashi" and "uchiawase" (see above), 
decisions tend to be made between employers and employees not just from the top down 
but also from the bottom up. Although top managers may sometimes float ideas, they are 
actually discussed and analyzed throughout company and then put forward for 
ratification at the top (the ringi system) once there has been a great deal of discussion at 
all company levels. The final formal approval is called „ringi' and occurs when the 
document decided upon is passed from office to office for responsible officials to stamp 
with their seals. 
On the contrary, in Hungarian companies, strong leadership is expected from the 
top and this occurs despite the fact that there might not be agreement at the bottom. 
Leadership in the West may vary from an autocratic type of system where the company 
chairman alone makes a decision or it may include a group of managers, privy to certain 
information, who actually make the decisions informally. In most cases, decisions do not 
tend to float up and down throughout the company with managers making their decisions 
based on the feedback that they can gather from each sector in the company. 83 
The Japanese have a decision-making process in which problems are minimized 
through pre-impact extensive evaluation. Such an evaluation seeks feedback from up 
and down and cross the corporation and only when consensus is reached is action taken. 
In the Western decision-making process, it is still largely the case that action is taken 
and extensive evaluation is carried out after the decision has been implemented. 
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This tendency towards solving problems after they have been created rather than 
eliminating them before they occur fits in with the whole Western perspective of 
scientific management and the assembly-line. 
The Japanese style is the following: to evaluate first, making action as risk-free as 
possible to involve as many company members as possible in this process, and to 
empower actual operators in decision-making processes in their production sphere. 84 
In the Japanese company, control is delegated down throughout all levels of 
management, not just held by the most senior officials. Delegation operates through the 
entire ranking system from „shacho" (president), ,juyaki" (director), „bucho" 
(department head), „kacho" (section head) and the many other titles of ranking. The 
„hira-shain" or ordinary worker, is mainly involved in decision-making through quality 
circles and the suggestion system or in other limited ways that have direct implications 
for their jobs. 85 
10.4. Group management 
Job rotation ensures that the majority in the company have done the jobs of 
others and the ranking hierarchical order usually means that the managers at the top 
level have worked their way up through the company so they know how every facet of 
the company is organized. 
Group management in the Japanese case, therefore, is genuine group 
management in that people can readily replace each other. The people that fill the 
positions at the present time are not the most important part of the company. They are 
valued, but in the sense that they, like a family, ensure the continuity of that particular 
lineage branch of the company but not that they in themselves are the most important 
parts that will make or break a company. 
In the Western companies, because of the greater emphasis on leadership, when a 
good leader departs, the company may often go into crisis. A charismatic and individual 
leader is of the greatest importance and can make or break a particular company. 86 
10.5. Some professional characteristics of management in Japan and in Hungary 
Currently in Hungary manufacturing businesses are not run by those expert in 
manufacturing but by lawyers, PR marketing people and financial executives who are 
usually unexperienced in manufacturing. As long as people who lack manufacturing 
experience are attempting to run manufacturing plants, they will not be as effective or as 
prolific as Japanese companies which are run by the very people who are hired to 
produce the goods. 
In Hungarian companies, specialists predominate whether they are practitioners 
or not. By comparison, in Japan people are generalists through job rotation and on-the-
job training rather than specialists. They then become actual practitioners in a particular 
company, dealing with day-to-day problems and integrally involved with that company. 
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In addition, if people are not involved in the day-to-day workings of the company 
at different levels and do not learn of many different jobs from their own experience, 
they do not have the long-term commitment that is needed to allow a systems approach 
based on Total Quality Control and management to work. The workforce, including 
management level, needs to know the ins and outs of the jobs that they do before they 
can implement quality control. 87 
10.6. Performance assessment 
The manner in which performance is assessed is another major difference 
between Japanese and Hungarian workplaces. 
The Hungarian management decisions are motivated by goals that are related to 
objectives while in the Japanese case decisions made by management tend to be far 
more consensus based. The majority of Hungarian managers saw that the link between 
pay and performance was their main motivating force in obtaining the best from their 
workforce. The important point in the Hungarian management behavior is where one can 
achieve the highest rates of pay, in the most direct and shortest way possible. 
On the contrary, in Japanese companies the main motivation for working hard is 
not pay as such. Managers are motivated by how quickly they and their peer group 
members are promoted. It is considered quite status enhancing to be promoted relatively 
quickly along with one's university peer group. 
A conflict exists in that, although consensus is the norm and the goals of the 
group are the most important. There is fierce competition between individual group 
members that actually serves to increase motivation for promotion. Therefore, ideas of 
consensus and harmony do not exclude a very rigorous sense of competition. The 
difference between Japanese and Western competition is that the competition is 
contained within the group and there are certain accepted rules within the group that 
usually ameliorate the bad effects of this fierce competition. 88 
11. The personality of Japanese workers and basic conditions of Japanese labor 
relations 
11.1. General remarks 
The Japanese have the reputation of being hard workers. There are several ways 
the Japanese show themselves to be hard workers. The first is that they devote 
themselves to doing the jobs they are given. Second, the rate of employee absenteeism is 
extremely low. Third, the Japanese feel almost no resistance to doing overtime and 
working on holidays. Thus the total number of hours worked annually is comparatively 
long. However, there are some opinions saying, the Japanese take overtime voluntarily 
87 Ruth Taplin, pp. 73-74. 
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because they are interested in the overtime payment. Nowadays this is an immanent and 
important part of many households income. . 
The Japanese positive attitude toward work is based on centuries of custom. The 
major reasons can be found in the fact that the traditional Japanese life was based on rice 
paddy farming. Their customary rules regulated communal work and village life as 
whole. Consequently, the Japanese people — especially farmers — came to live according 
to an ethic of diligence and thrift rather similar to the so-called Protestant Ethic (see 
Max Weber) in the West, in the late Tokugawa period. 
Still another form of the Japanese willingness to work hard is the tendency for the 
elderly to continue working after the compulsory retirement. Japan's life time 
employment system provides employment until retirement, recently age of 60. However, 
retirement has not ment the end of employment, but only a separation from the firm one 
has been working for. The retired Japanese have not left the labor market; instead, they 
have found new jobs and continued to work for an average of almost another full 
decade. Consequently, about sixty-five per cent of the Japanese aged sixty-five have 
been working. In many cases it means that they leave the so-called „internal labor 
market", but they don't quit from the external labor market. Nevertheless, these days the 
problem arising from the phenomenon of graying society makes it difficult to employ the 
already retired employees. 89 
11.2. The Japanese Workers' Personality 
Japanese workers seem to posses a sort of dual personality in matters of 
industrial relations. On the one hand, as union members, they feel a spirit of loyalty to 
their labor union; on the other hand, as employees with a relationship of lifetime 
employment with their enterprise, they also feel a sense of loyalty towards the 
enterprise.90 
As can be seen from practices such as the lifetime employment system and 
seniority system and communal consciousness where a company is one big family, 
Japanese firms contain within themselves a form of communal human relationship. 91 
Consequently, Japanese workers regarded themselves as a member of their companies 
rather than as being employed by their employer. This is the state of mind of employees. 
In contrary, the Hungarian employees tend to take benefits from companies and 
the relationships in the companies often do not concern emotional relationships. The 
employees are not required to have any close relationships with each other and certainly 
with the dependent ones. There is a distinction between the public and private sphere, 
the family and the company. The Japanese form of group spirit enormously tends to be 
lacking in Hungarian companies. Employees will work for the firm which will benefit 
them the most, and from which they can take the most. Employers will hire those from 
whom they believe that they can take the most as wel1. 92 
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11.3. Basic social background conditions of Japanese industrial relations 
Why do workers have a community-type relationship with the enterprise in 
pursuit of profits where they happen to be employed? The answer strongly relates to the 
special feature of the traditional community in Japan. Most countries in East-Asia 
maintain communities of blood relations consisting mainly of family members or of 
relatives, whereas Japan alone has, in addition, a community of village or of regional 
community. 
In the Japanese case, there are many mechanisms that persuade people to 
conform and to strive towards harmonious relationships; some of these ideas involve 
psychological dependence, learned at a very early age, called „amae" (psychological 
dependence) and ideas of „ninjo" (loyalty) and „giri" (obligation) which deal with 
obligation, loyalty and friendship. Ideas that the safety of the individual can only be 
guaranteed by belonging to a group, that the group allows the individual to be safe and 
secure beginning with a family and then with the corporation, are normative to Japan. 
The corporation offers job security, and patrimonial relations between the higher and 
lower levels of the organization. There exists an understood assumption that the 
employees in a big corporation will be cared for and therefore will be safe as long as 
they work hard in harmony with the rest of the group and try not to disrupt the stability 
of the organization.93 
For the same reason, an enterprise in Japan can have the character of a 
community and the workers in the same workplace can be members of the workplace 
community. The community which thus emerged was not of the type consisting of 
relatives, but one evolving of a village or a regional society. For this reason, it is 
difficult to expect that the same situation can hold true with other Asian or European 
countries. 
Beside the family-like relationship, paternalism is also a dominant feature of the 
Japanese industrial relations. It means that employees are treated as if they were 
members of a personified family (enterprise), and extracted the lifetime employment 
system as the essence of Japanese industrial relations. 94 
In the Japanese assumptive world, trust is basically invested in groups of 
individuals and the main way of organizing in society has to do with exercising social 
consensus. Social consensus which brings social control, therefore, is an essential part of 
Japanese society that may be gained through compromise and negotiation. Harmony is 
always striven for rather than conflict, which has caused a social law that is based on 
social relationships rather than impersonal state law to predominate. 
In Western terms, people are not trusted because the assumption is that all 
individuals are concerned for themselves and if that causes conflict and one person's 
interest subsumes that of another, then it is simply world reality, or the „laws of nature". 
Laws, therefore, have to be rigorously enforced to prevent people from pursuing their 
own individual interests at the expense of the rest of society. 95 
In a Japanese company people have prescribed relations among themselves 
through egalitarianism, which has allowed workers' suggestions to be accepted and to be 
encouraged. In the Western systems, conflict is often the norm between an autocratic 
93 Ruth Taplin, pp. 8-9. 
94 Mikio Sumiya, pp. 129-130. 
95 Ruth Taplin, 1995, pp. 8-9. 
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management and the workforce who have to carry out goals and objectives about which 
they have not been consulted by the management. This creates a great deal of 
antagonism which does not allow for quality circles to be effective because workers 
can't see where the quality circles are leading. If they feel that they are not being taken 
seriously as operators within the system, they will not see any sense in attending quality 
circles.96 
11.4. Vertical egalitarianism 
Groupism and egalitarian ranking are one of the basic primary elements of the 
Japanese society's uniqueness.97 The idea of ranking and authority derives from 
Confucianism-based ideas of moral codes which are practiced in varying degrees of 
strictness throughout Japanese society. 98 
However, the idea of vertical egalitarianism-based ranking is a contradictory 
feature of Japanese society, which visibly exists in the corporations as well. It means 
that the cohesion of a certain group is primary and everyone is allowed equal 
membership in that group but in a socially agreed and accepted hierarchically-ranked 
order.99 
In this system the leader's role is not to enhance his/her own importance or to 
lead per se but rather to facilitate group harmony and consensus in his/her capacity as 
group organizer. 100 
The organization of work in Japan is corporate based. A corporate harmonious 
pattern of work is used that benefits the entire group. Social relations give rise to a form 
of corporate group-based egalitarianism which is vertically ranked. 101 
Contrary, in the Western context, however, jobs may be linked to identity. In a 
class-based society such as many European nations, among them Hungary as well, 
occupation and education are integrally linked and occupational class-based scales are 
very rigorously assessed when people go out to find a job or attempt to obtain another 
one. People in a class-related occupation (i.e. manager, lawyer, professor, doctor etc.) 
hold a certain status because of their education and occupation. It is this education and 
occupation which provides security. The status which they have held in one job or their 
educational status provide them with the basic requirements to obtain another job. 
In this environment, the company they first join in itself does not offer automatic 
security and safety, and the employer does not expect their employee to stay for ever in 
the firm. What does provide safety and security, if there is any, is the educational and 
occupational background of a particular employee. The emphasis in Western culture is 
basically on job mobility. Most people will move from one company to another to 
increase not only their breadth of experience but also their salaries, rather than wait for 
years for some movement at the top. Job satisfaction and salary are often linked, rather 
97 Ruth Taplin, pp. 13-14. 
99 Ruth Taplin, pp. 10-11. 
100 Ruth Taplin, pp. 13-14. 
96 Ruth Taplin, pp. 59-60. 
98 Ruth Taplin, pp. 13-14. 
101 Ruth Taplin, pp. 15-16. 
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than feelings of safety and security within a particular company. In fact, safety and 
security are not really a feature of Western employment practice. 102 
11.5. Absenteeism in Hungary 
Four-fifths of all full-day absences are caused by the inability to work for reasons 
of ill health. The analysis of absenteeism caused by ill health confirms the general, 
international experience that this absence is also not completely involuntary. Workplace 
conditions, the equilibrium of the labor market, the economic activity of women, the 
possibilities of complementary surplus earnings, the system of social insurance, terms 
and conditions governing benefits in the case of illness, the health services and the 
relationship between doctors and patients and other factors greatly influence the 
workers' choices between a state of „illness" and „health", which, in turn, determines the 
level of absenteeism and changes in absenteeism. 
A large part of a further one-tenth of full-day absences is allowed by the 
enterprise, as unpaid leave. Most of these absences occur for family or other private 
reasons. A small part of unpaid absences is „unjustified" absence when employees stay 
away from work without any acceptable reason. According to empirical investigations, 
full-day absences for reasons other than ill health are in reality more numerous than 
shown in registered statistics. 103 
This is an important issue in Hungary, because the absenteeism rate is very high ' 
compared to Japan and to another market economy. Unfortunately, in this paper we have 
no possibility to deal with and analyze the detailed reasons. 
12. Evaluation and trends 
Finally we enumerate some basic issues and considered problems inspired by this 
paper. These are following: 
Job rotation: too frequent, which means that managers in charge have not the 
time to be familiar and effective in his/her new job assignment, because before it they 
are moved to another post. 
Specialist-generalist conflict (Western managers are specialist in one field; 
they trained to execute aíarticular type of job and they learned very particular skills to 
do — contrary, Japanese managers, mostly because of job rotation, are generalist, who 
are flexible and improvising and picking up skills in the course of doing the job). 
Employees are able to rotate jobs and learn new technologies. They are thus very 
adaptable and can apply their skill to whatever job is before them. Everyone, no matter 
what university they have graduated from, starts at the bottom and climbs up to the top 
management. This engenders a certain sense of humbleness and also teaches staff all 
aspects of the functioning of the company. This is necessary for the implementation of 
life-time employment. However, the question still remained, whether are they able to 
fulfill successfully every position within the management circles. 
102 Ruth Taplin, pp. 21-22. 
103 Times are changing, working time in 14 industrialized countries, ed. Gerhard Bosch, Peter 
Dawkins and Francois Michon, International Institute for Labor Studies, Geneva, 1993 pp. 178-179. 
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Japanese managers tend to make decisions as a consensus group decision in 
which the length of the decision making process (top-down/bottom-up type) is long; In 
contrary, Western managers tended to make decisions individually and quickly. 
Many Japanese employees work so hard that some die (karoshi), some are 
perpetually exhausted and many rarely see their families because they work so late. Sick 
pay is not offered in most companies, there is even a legal obligation, and if ill, days off 
are deducted from annual leave. The average working day is from 9.00 am to 8.00 p.m. 
or 9.00 p.m. or even late night. Colleagues at work are all expected to go drinking 
together after hours and at weekends to play golf. 
workers express their demands and suggestions while management 
communicates the needs of the company and policies for discussion. Where the system 
is deficient is that the decisions made in the actual working groups which meet in either 
workshops or quality circles have no real binding decision-making power. In the final 
result, it is the top managers who take the decisions, having taken into account all the 
feedback. Social pressure makes everyone agree. 
In the West, it is quite usual for people to separate being busy at work from 
resting at home or somewhere else, making a division between the public and private life 
of the individual. This type of separation, however, is not one that occurs readily in 
Japan. The family life may be private but many Japanese workers and managers rarely 
spend time with their family. After hours drinking, dinner parties, socializing and golf 
tend to keep company people, above all men, away from their homes. 
One of the basic considerations why the Japanese industrial relation system is 
unique, has already been noted earlier, namely that it is both ranked and hierarchical and 
has also a tendency towards groupism and egalitarianism. 
The principle of management-led social relations is central to understanding how 
the Japanese manage their companies and their workforces. Even the labor unions, 
except minority unions, which may seem quite strong but which are not separate entities 
as they are in the West, are part of this process. The management invariably achieves 
dominance in the Japanese framework because unions are organized in such a way as to 
allow everyone to participate but which in the end, in many cases allows management to 
make the final decisions. 
Japanese managers are a powerful tool in eliminating and neutralizing complaints 
of blatant managerial dominance. If, for example, there is a recession or there are 
financial problems within a company, the managers reduce their salaries accordingly. 
This is a very powerful argument within the collective bargaining arena to keep wages 
frozen or at a particular level, because managers can rightly say that what is good for 
them is good for everyone else in the company. 104 
Furthermore, one of the keys to Japanese success is their very keen understanding 
of the needs of the customer, how to behave towards the customer, and how to make it 
easy for the customer to purchase the companies' goods. 105 
104 Ruth Taplin, pp. 112-113. 
105 Ruth Taplin, p. 123. 
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Some final remark 
This is a semi-final paper of a project conducted by the Faculty of Law of The 
University of Tokyo. The main aim of this study was to give a general comparative 
overview on the possible implementation of the Japanese industrial relations system in 
some developing countries, namely in my case the Hungarian situation. As we indicated 
above, this is the first written product of our research, consequently it touched upon only 
the most important and well known topics. Therefore, in the near future we intend to 
fulfill the original aim of the project and to submit a more detailed and sophisticated 
material. 
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APPENDIX 
I dil ■ c ,, 
Table 1 
Balance of labor force in Hungary (January 1) 
Thousands 
Population by activity 	I 	1990 	I 	1991 	I 	1992 	I 	1993 
Population 
Population under working age 2 130.5 2 063.7 2 009.8 1 958.0 
Population in working age 5 956.8 5 997.4 6 031.4 6 056.5 
Retired 2 287.5 2 293.7 2 296.0 2 295.7 
Total _ 	10 374.8 	_ 10 354.8 10 337.2 10 310.2 
Source of labor force 
Population in working age 5 956.8 5 997.4 6 031.4 6 056.5 
Male 3107.2 3125.4 3141.7 3152.6 
Female 2 849.6 2 872.0 2 889.7 2 903.9 
Active earners 
out 
 of working 110.4 101.6 86.9 68.2 
Male 44.7 35.6 37.4 27.7 
Female 65.7 66.0 49.5 40.5 
Employed pensioners over 
working age 
378.0 333.0 247.3 185.3 
Male 177.9 152.3 108.9 78.7 
Female 200.1 180.7 138.4 106.6 
Total 6 445.2 6 432.0 6 365.6 6 310.0 
Male 3 329.8 3 313.3 3 288.0 3 259.0 
Female 3 115.4 3 118.7 3 077.6 3 051.0 
Source of labor force by economic activity 
Economically active population - 	5 496.1 5 404.4 5 202.3 5 015.0 
Male 2 825.0 2 792.3 2 655.3 2 583.5 
Female ' 	2 671.1 2 612.3 2 547.0 2 431.5 
People working abroad 3.6 15.0 30.0 28.0 
Male 2.6 ' 	10.5 21.0 20.0 
Female 1.0 4.5 9.0 8.0 
Inactive population in working 
age 
945.5 1 012.6 1 133.3 1 267.0 
Male 502.2 510.7 611.7 655.5 
Female 443.3 501.9 521.6 611.5 
Of which: student 483.0 519.5 547.6 565.4 
Male 250.4 269.9 280.3 286.5 
Female 232.6 249.6 267.3 278.9 
Pensioner 251.0 282.1 346.3 364.9 
Male 157.1 175.8 202.2 ' 215.9 
Female 93.9 106.3 144.1 149.0 
Dependents 211.5 211.0 239.4 336.7 
Male 94.7 65.0 129.4 153.1 
Female 116.8 146.0 110.2 183.6 
Source: Hungarian Statistical Year Book, KSH, 1994, p. 53 






























1960 37.5 30.2 34.4 60.3 39.8 43.1 32.7 
1970 62.9 57.4 56.7 74.1 67.7 68.5 65.7 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 102.9 105.0 101.2 103.3 101.4 102.8 98.0 
1982 105.8 109.9 100.5 115.4 101.3 104.0 94.6 
1983 106.5 111.9 100.3 115.5 99.6 104.5 87.6 
1984 109.4 114.7 97.9 120.8 99.9 105.8 85.5 
1985 109.1 112.3 93.4 115.8 100.3 107.6 82.5 
1986 110.7 111.7 93.58 119.9 104.2 110.2 89.6 
1987 115.2 115.3 100.8 116.3 107.5 113.8 92.5 
1988 115.1 113.6 , 95.3 125.5 104.4 110.6 89.4 _ 
1989 115.9 111.3 103.2 124.0 105.3 111.5 90.5 
1990 111.8 102.7 80.6 118.2 102.2 108.5 86.7 
1991 98.5 84.3 68.5 108.5 92.2 102.7 67.3 
1992 94.3 77.6 68.0 93.4 86.6 101.3 50.5 
1993 92.1 77.4 65.3 79.7 95.3 106.4 68.8 
Source: Hungarian Statistical Year Book, KSH, 1994, p. 70 
Table 3 
The main sectors' contribution to the GDP in Hungary (%) 
I 	1980 I 	1990 1991 I 	1992 1993 
Public sector 90 76 70 56 42 
Private sector 
(domestic) 
10 23 27 36 45 
Private sector 
(foreign) 
0 1 3 8 13 
Total GDP 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: R. Andorka-T. Kolosi-Gy. Vukovich ed.: Társadalmi Riport (Social Report) 1994, TÁRKI, 
1994, p. 220. 
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Table 4 
The changed proportion of the sectors' contribution to GDP in Hungary between 
1980 and 1993 
I 	1980 I 	1993 
Public sector 90 42 
Private sector (domestic) 10 45 
Private sector (foreign) 0 13 
Total 100 100 
Source: R. Andorka—T. Kolosi—Gy. Vukovich ed.: Társadalmi Riport (Social Report) 1994, TÁRKI, 
1994, p. 223. 
Table S 
The hidden economy's contribution to the GDP in Hungary, divided by sectors 
I 1980 I 	1990 I 	1991 1992 I 	1993 
Public sector 21 17 14 10 8 
Private sector 
(domestic) 
79 83 85 88 90 
Private sector 
(foreign) 
0 0 1 2 2 
Total GDP  100 100 100 100 100 
Source: R. Andorka—T. Kolosi—Gy. Vukovich ed.: Társadalmi Riport (Social Report) 1994, TÁRKI, 
1994, p. 221. 
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Table 6 
The managers' ownership features in Hungary (1989-1993) 
There was 
his/her share in 
the company in 
1989 
The managers' ownership situation in 1993 





Only in other 
company 
Political elite - 62.5 12.5 25.0 
Top managers 22.6 19.2 9.4 23.4 
Middle ranked 
managers 










20.2 49.5 29.3 20.2 
Blue collar 
workers 
33.8 48.1 14.3 49.5 
Average 12.1 20.5 8.5 21.8 
Source: R. Andorka-T. Kolosi-Gy. Vukovich ed.: Társadalmi Riport (Social Report) 1994, TÁRKI, 
1994, p. 348. 
Table 7 
The total and the private sector's workforce in different branches in Hungary (%) 
Branches Total workforce Private sector 
1992 1993 1992 1993 
Industry 26.9 25.3 37.0 33.1 
Construction 6.1 5.7 11.3 8.1 
Agriculture 10.9 8.9 5.5 10.3 
Commerce 12.7 12.7 21.4 20.9 
Health, Culture 15.3 17.6 2.4 3.2 
Other services 18.3 20.7 22.4 24.4 
Public 
Administration 
9.8 7.4 - - 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: R. Andorka-T. Kolosi-Gy Vukovich ed.: Társadalmi Riport (Social Report) 1994, TARKI, 
1994, p. 366. 
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Table 8 
Hungarian Enterprises with Foreign Direct Investment by Categories of the 






















HUF billion HUF 
billion 
- 1 3 406 3.4 1.8 8 361 5.7 3.4 
1.1- 
10 
3839 12.3 6.8 5914 19.5 11.8 
10.1- 
50 
1 009 24.9 13.7 1 452 34.8 21.3 
50.1 - 100 320 22.9 12.4 536 36.6 23.2 
100.0 - 543 412.1 180.3 919 616.4 342.1 




1 190 38.3 38.3 4 635 118.3 118.3 
With majority of 
foreign 
participation 
2 004 148.5 104.3 4 273 276.0 202.9 
With majority of 
domestic 
participation 
5 923 288.8 72.4 8 274 318.7 80.7 
Source: Hungarian Statistical Year Book, KSH, 1994, p. 67 
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Table 9 
Total Population and Labour Force in Japan (1,000 persons) 
Total population 123,980 
Labour force 65,050 
Participation rate (%) 63.8 
Male Total Population 63,930 
Labour force 38,540 
Participation rate (%) 77.6 





Female Total Population 63,050 
Labour force 26,510 
Participation rate 50.7 





Source: ILO, Year Book of Labor Statistics, 1992. 
Table 10 
Private Establishments and Number of Persons Engaged by Size of Establishment 
in Japan (1991) 
Size of Establishment Number of establishment 
(Distributions %) 
Number of employed 
(distributions %) 
All sizes 6,559,381 100.0% 55,014,018 100,0 
1-4 persons 4,221,069 64.3 9,199,536 16,7 
5-29 persons 2,052,790 31.3 21,116,549 38,4 
30-99 persons 233,597 3.6 11,425,293 20,8 
100-299 persons 42,487 0.6 6,673,059 12,1 
300 or more persons  9,438 0.1 6,599,671 12,0 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Establishment Census of Japan, 1991. 
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Table 11 
Ratio of Employed Persons by Industry in Japan (%) 
Industry Ratio 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry & fishing 
6.6 
Mining & quarrying 0.1 
Manufacturing ' 23.8 
Electricity, gas & water 0.5 
Construction 9.3 
Wholesale, retail trade, 
restaurants & hotels 
22.0 
Transport, storage & 
communication 
5.8 
Financing, insurance, real 
estate & business services 
8.3 
Communicaty, social & 
personal services 
21.1 
Not adequately defined 0.4 
Unemployed 2.1 
Total 100.0 
Source: ILO, Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1992. 
Table 12 
New School Leavers and Persons Entering the Labor Market in Japan (1,000 
persons; %) 







Junior college University 
March 
1960 
633 38.6 567 61.3 18 58.8 100 83.2 
1965 549 26.5 690 60.4 35 63.8 135 83.4 
1970 214 16.3 803 58.2 80 70.3 188 78.1 
1975 63 5.9 577 44.6 103 73.3 233 74.3 
1980 44 3.9 581 42.9 129 76.0 285 75.3 
1985 50 3.7 547 41.1 141 80.7 288 77.2 
1989 43 2.9 591 35.6 174 85.1 300 79.6 
1990 40 2.8 608 35.2 181 87.0 324 81.0 
1991 36 2.6 607 34.4 188 87.0 348 81.3 
1992 31 2.3 584 33.1 194 85.7 350 79.9 
Source: Ministry of Education Basic Statistical Survey on School. 
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Table 13 
Source of Juvenile Labor Force in Hungary 
thousands 
Source of labor force 1991 1992 1993 Of which 
_ 	Male ( Female 
Completed studies in higher education 16.9 17.1 16.8 8.2 8.6 
Completed secondary school or dropped 
out of higher education 
37.2 41.9 55.1 27.2 27.9 
Of which 12.6 13.1 17.4 7.2 10.2 
Completed general secondary school 19.3 22.4 31.1 14.8 16.3 
Completed vocational secondary school 5.3 6.4 6.6 5.2 1.4 
Completed technical school 55.4 63.0 60.0 39.6 20.4 
Passed skilled worker's examination 2.4 2.0 1.7 - 1.7 
Completed school for short-hand-typing 1.5 2.0 1.8 0.0 1.8 
Completed other specialized secondary 
school 
1.0 . 1.6 5.7 1.6 4.1 
Completed primary (general) school and 
did not continue learning or dropped out 
of secondary school 
40.7 35.0 32.8 17.8 15.0 
Didn't finish primary (general) school, 
reached the age of 16 
12.4 10.0 6.8 4.1 2.7 
Total 167.5 172.6 180.3 98.3 82.0 
Of which 
Skilled 101.8 114.5 123.3 69.2 54.1 
Unskilled 65.7 58.1 57.0 29.1 27.9 
Source: Hungarian Statistical Year Book, KSH, 1994, p. 57 
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Table 14 
Number of Labor Unions and Their Membership in Japan 
(As of June 30, 1992) 





1935 993 ' 408,662 6.9 
1940 49 9,455 0.1 
1945 509 380,677 . 	3.2 
1950 29,144 5,773,908 46.2 
1955 32,012 6,285,878 35.6 
1 960 41,561 7,661,568 32.2 
1965 52,879 10,146,872 34.8 
1970 60,954 11,604,770 35.4 
1975 69,333 12,590,400 34.4 
1980 72,693 12,369,262 30.8 
1985 74,499 12,417,527 28.9 
1990 72,202 12,264,509 25.2 
1991 71,685 12,396,592 24.5 
1992 1 71,881 12,540,691 24.4 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Basic Survey on Labor Unions, 1993 
Table 15 
Union Membership and Unionization Rate in Main Countries 
Japan United States United Germany 
(1992) (1992) Kingdom (1991) 
(1990) 
Number of employees 
(in thousands) 
51,190 103,688 22,656 32,890 
Union membership 
(in thousands) 
12,541 16,390 9,947 13,817 
Unionization rate 24.4 15.8 43.9 42.0 
(To) 
Sources: Japan: Management and Cooperation Agency, Labor Force Survey, 1992 and Ministry of 
Labor, Basic Survey on Labor Unions, 1992 
U.S.: Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings. 
U.K.: Department of Employment, Employment Gazette. 
Germany: Statistiches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch. 
107 These figures are based on Tan-i rodo kumiai (Unit labor unions). This is the basic 
organizational unit for unions in Japan and is comprised of workers in the factory, office site, etc. or an 
enterprise. 
108 Based on Tan-itsu rodo kumiai (Enterprise labor union) which in most cases, are comprised of 
the unions of a single enterprise. 
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Table 16 
Monthly Regular Wage Differencials by Job Status in Japan (1,000 yen) 
Year I 	Director I  Section Chief I 	Chief Clerk 	I Non Position 
1982 449.8 359.2 302.0 203.0 
1983 466.6 372.9 311.8 209.6 
1984 478.6 382.7 321.7 217.2 
1985 488.1 394.5 333.1 226.5 
1986 504.2 408.2 344.2 232.0 
1987 518.1 417.7 347.0 237.2 
1988 529.1 425.4 359.6 245.2 
1989 553.0 445.2 372.7 256.3 
1990 575.6 463.8 390.2 268.2 
1991 592.8 475.7 403.5 278.9 
1992 600.5 489.8 404.5 279.8 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Basic Survey on Wage Structure, 1993 
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Table 17 
Wage Differencials by Size of Enterprises and Age in Japan (Male) 
(1,000 or more= 100) 
Age (A) /Size of 
establishment (S) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 








(S)100-999 89.8 89.5 86.3 85.4 84.6 84.0 85.5 
10-99 86.8 82.9 81.2 78.8 79.3 79.3 81.3 
(A) - 17 
(5)100-999 95.2 98.0 100.5 105.3 106.2 106.2 107.3 
10-99 95.2 95.2 103.5 103.0 107.9 106.9 108.7 
(A) 18-19 
(5)100-999 94.8 95.1 96.5 95.2 96.2 93.3 97.0 
10-99 97.4 93.7 95.9 .93.3 95.7 91.6 98.2 
(A) 20-24 
(S)100-999 100.7 98.2 94.6 95.5 95.4 94.1 96.8 
10-99 104.9 98.7 94.7 97.5 99.4 94.6 101.2 
(A) 25-29 
(S)100-999 101.7 98.9 93.3 92.6 94.6 92.3 95.3 
10-99 103.8 97.4 95.1 93.9 96.6 91.3 98.3 
(A) 30-34 
(S)100-999 98.9 97.7 92.4 89.9 89.6 87.5 90.3 
10-99 	 ' 96.3 92.9 90.0 87.2 88.8 83.7 89.7 
(A) 35-39 
(5)100-999 95.0 94.6 90.0 89.7 87.6 85.7 87.9 
10-99 88.5 85.5 84.4 82.9 82.7 79.2 83.6 
(A) 40-44 
(5)100-999 88.7 90.2 86.5 86.9 86.0 84.2 85.6 
10-99 78.5 78.3 78.3 76.7 77.3 74.7 77.1 
(A) 45-49 
(5)100-999 88.7 86.6 82.9 82.7 83.3 82.9 83.7 
10-99 78.5 73.5 71.8 70.7 71.8 71.1 72.1 
(A) 50-154 
(5)100-999 79.0 81.7 82.4 80.0 81.0 81.0 81.6 
10-99 68.2 67.5 69.8 66.6 68.1 67.9 69.1 
(A) 55-59 
(S)100-999 79.0 76.6 82.7 80.0 82.9 81.8 83.0 
10-99 68.2 65.1 71.7 70.1 71.2 69.6 71.4 
(A) 60-64 
(5)100-999 85.3 80.3 92.1 92.8 88.9 88.1 88.3 
10-99 82.2 72.6 84.5 84.0 79.2 83.2 84.0 
(A) 65- 
(5)100-999 85.3 80.3 89.9 104.8 87.2 98.6 98.6 
10-99 82.2 72.6 83.4 89.1 76.6 93.8 94.9 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Basic Survey on Wage Structure, 1993 
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Table 18 
Average Daily Amount of Regional and Industrial Minimum Wages in Japan 
(As of March 31, 1993) 
Minimum Wages I I Average Daily Amount (yen) 
Regional Minimum Wages 4,501 
Industrial Minimum Wages 
Foodstuffs 4,717 
Textiles 4,743 
Lumber, woodwork, furniture 
etc. 
5,235 
Pulp, paper 5,038 
Publishing, printing 5,200 
Ceramic 4,624 
Machinery and metal 
processing 
5,099 
Automobile repair 4,423 
Wholesale and retail 4,889 
Others 5,478 
Total: 5,063 
Mining (central decision) 6,627 
Source: Ministry of Labor 
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Table 19 
Wage Increase Trends Determined by Spring Labor Offensive and Bonus Payments 
in Japan (Summer and Year-end) 
Year Wage Increase at Spring Labor 
Offensive (%) 
Bonus Payment Increase (%) 
(Major Firms) 




1978 5.75 6.4 2.2 5.5 
1979 5.83 6.5 11.5 10.3 
1980 6.74 7.4 10.3 8.7 
1981 7.68 7.9 7.6 7.2 
1982 7.01 6.9 5.2 3.2 
1983 4.40 4.5 1.7 2.7 
1984 4.46 4.5 4.5 5.2 
1985 5.03 4.8 6.0 4.4 
1986 4.55 4.2 2.1 1.5 
1987 3.56 3.3 1.8 2.5 
1988 4.43 3.9 5.7 6.7 
1989 5.17 4.7 8.1 8.5 
1990 5.94 5.53 8.0 6.8 
1991 5.65 5.52 5.5 3.6 
1992 4.95 4.98 2.7 0.2 
Source: Surveyed by Ministry of Labor, 1993 
Note: Surveys are based upon results from 290 major firms and 8,000 small and medium scale firms, 
all of which are organized. 
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Table 20 
The Hungarian Wage Structure in 1994 (%) 
Gross month- 
ly salary 







(HUF) Man Wo- 
man 
Total Man Wo- 
man 
Total Man Wo- 
man 
Total 
-10,000 0.9 2.2 1.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.9 -8850 
10,001- 2.4 5.5 3.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 2.0 3.0 2.5 8851- 
12, 000 10,329 
12,001- 2.9 9.5 5.4 0.4 1.3 1.0 2.2 5.1 3.6 10,330- 
14,000 11,745 
14,001- 6.5 18.8 11.1 1.2 3.8 2.9 5.1 10.8 7.9 11,746- 
17, 000 13,742 
17,001- 9.4 17.3 12.4 2.0 6.4 4.9 7.4 11.5 9.4 13,743- 
20,000 15,733 
20,001- 18.7 20.7 19.3 5.8 15.2 11.9 15.1 17.8 16.3 15,734- 
25,000 18,673 
25,001- 18.3 12.4 16.0 8.3 17.2 14.0 15.6 14.9 15.2 18,674- 
30, 000 21,549 
30,001- 13.3 6.4 10.7 9.5 14.0 12.4 12.3 10.5 11.4 21,550- 
35,000 24,425 
35,001- 9.4 3.3 7.1 10.2 10.2 9.6 7.0 8.3 7.8 24,426- 
40,000 27,115 
40,001- 10.1 2.6 7.3 16.5 13.4 14.4 11.8 8.4 10.2 27,116- 
50,000 32,425 
50,001- 6.3 1.1 4.4 21.0 10.5 14.3 10.3 6.1 8.3 32,426- 
70,000 42,400 
70,001- 1.5 0.2 1.1 13.2 4.3 7.4 4.7 2.4 3.6 42,401- 
1 00, 000 57,268 
100,001- 0.3 0.0 0.2 7.0 1.9 3.7 2.1 1.0 1.6 57,269- 
150, 000 82,048 
150,001- 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.8 1.9 1.1 0.4 0.8 82,049- 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 




Employed Persons in Non-Agricultural Industries by Employment Status in Japan 
(1,000 persons) 



















1980 50,040 6,980 1,800 5,180 3,540 39,410 35,670 2,520 1,230 
1985 53,430 6,980 1,840 5,140 3,410 42,850 35,370 3,170 1,200 
1986 54,030 6,990 1,870 5,120 3,380 43,500 39,130 3,190 1,180 
1987 54,650 7,030 1,910 5,130 3,430 43,990 39,440 3,420 1,130 
1988 55,760 7,040 1,910 5,130 3,440 45,070 40,320 3,560 1,190 
1989 57,090 6,990 1,880 5,110 3,410 46,480 41,550 3,720 1,220 
1990 58,390 6,820 1,850 4,980 3,300 48,060 42,960 3,890 1,210 
1991 59,770 6,730 1,800 4,930 3,130 49,720 44,560 3,940 1,230 
1992 60,610 6,610 1,820 4,790 2,950 50,860 45,660 4,040 1,170 
Male 36,230 4,320 1,480 2,840 550 31,250 29,630 1,110 500 
Female  24,380 2,300 340 1,960 2,400 19,620 16,020 2,930 670 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Labour Force Survey, 1992. 
Table 22 




Number (1,000) Total Part-timres I 	Arubaito 
Total 47,430 37,560 9,860 5,650 4,210 
Male 28,810 26;100 2,700 370 2,330 
Female 18,620 11,460 7,160 5,280 1,880 
Percentage 
Total 100.0 79.2 20.8 11.9 8.9 
Male 100.0 90.6 9.4 1.3 8.1 
Female 100.0 61.5 38.5 28.4 10.1 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Special Survey of Labour Force, 1993. 
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Table 23 



















1980 5 073.6 264.0 396.0 5 733.6 - 5 733.6 85.0 - 
1981 5 014.5 254.1 432.0 5 700.6 - _ 5 700.6 85.0 - 
1982 5 001.9 241.5 435.0 5 678.4 - 5 678.4 85.4 - 
1983 4 970.0 233.2 443.0 5 646.3 - 5 646.3 85.3 - 
1984 4 940.0 223.9 452.0 5 615.9 - 5 615.9 85.0 - 
1985 4 912.9 217.6 460.0 5 590.5 - 5 590.5 84.8 - 
1986 4 892.5 219.8 468.0 5 580.3 - 5 580.3 84.9 - 
1987 4 885.2 224.8 479.0 5 589.0 6.4 5 595.4 85.5 0.1 
1988 4 844.8 230.7 473.0 5 548.5 10.9 5 559.4 85.2 0.2 
1989 4 822.7 241.0 441.3 5 505.0 14.2 5 519.2 85.3 0.3 
1990 4 795.2 244.7 432.0 5 471.9 24.2 5 496.1 85.3 0.4 
1991 4 668.7 251.6 383.6 5 303.9 100.5 5 404.4 84.0 1.9 
1992 4 241.8 262.1 292.3 4 796.2 406.1 5 202.3 81.7 7.8 
1993 3 866.9 262.1 223.0 4 352.0 663.0 5 015.0 79.5 13.2 
Source: Hungarian Statistical Year Book, KSH, 1994, p. 54. 
109 Persons taking advantage of child-care allowance of fee. 
70 
Table 24 
Unemployment Situation in Hungary 
Person 
Denomination 1991 1992 1993 June, 1994 
At the end of the year Male Female Total 
Number of registered 
unemployed 
406,124 663,027 632,050 319,463 237,000 556,463 
Manual workers 338,619 554,163 524,479 287,132 165,552 452,684 
Non-manual workers _ 	67,505 108,864 107,571 32,331 71,448 103,779 
Persons obtaining unemployment benefit 
Staff number at closing 
day 
312,077 476,962 326,618 115,224 92,655 207,879 
-Blue-collar workers 264,017 398,740 305,388 106,121 71,993 178,114 
-White-collar workers 48,060 78,222 21,230 9,103 20,662 29,765 
By school qualification 32,419 37,684 16,984 5,761 4,169 9,930 
-Less than 8 grades of 
primary (general) 
school 
113,073 170,279 105,151 32,608 33,819 66,427 
-Finished apprentice 
school 





6,206 807 3,521 4,328 
- Finished secondary 
school 
55,035 85,846 70,549 19,818 28,260 48,078 
Took part in high-level 
education 
9,372 11,924 8,819 3,572 2,594 6,166 
By period of the support (in days) 
0-60 79,303 70,280 56,623 18,083 18,167 36,250 
61-120 67,501 72,580 56,418 20,492 17,850 38,342 
121-180 48,635 55,081 39,137 20,993 16,379 37,372 
181-240 36,077 49,441 32,675 16,811 12,498 29,309 
241-300 25,574 48,156 29,430 14,094 11,265 25,359 
301-360 23,974 38,181 29,541 10,579 8,130 18,709 
361-420 9,085 39,102 34,806 3,283 1,677 4,960 
421- 27,748 104,141 47,988 10,889 6,689 17,578 
Source: Hungarian Statistical Year Book, KSH, 1994, p. 62 
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Table 25 
Distribution of Unemployed Persons by Duration of Job Search 110 
Duration of job 
search 













1-4 weeks 43,9 10,2 36,2 7,3 34,2 7,4 27,2 6,4 
5-14 weeks 90,9 21,0 74,8 15,2 64,8 14,0 48,5 11,3 
15-26 weeks 96,4 22,3 87,9 17,8 74,3 16,0 69,4 16,2 
27-52 weeks 121,3 28,0 135,2 27,5 _ 107,2 23,1 103,9 24,3 
53-78 weeks 41,7 9,6 75,1 15,2 73,2 15,8 63,2 14,8 
79 weeks and 
more 
38,4 8,9 83,7 17,0 109,6 23,7 115,4 27,0 
Total 432,6 100,0 492,9 100,0 463,3 100,0 427,6 100,0 
Source: Labor force survey; datas available in the Hungarian Statistical Year Book, KSH, 1994, p. 
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Table 26 
Number and Ratio of Unemployed Persons in Japan (1,000 persons; %) 
Year I 	Number I 	Percentage 
1975 1,000 1.9 
1980 1,140 2.0 
1985 1,560 2.6 
1990 1,340 2.1 
1992 1,420 2.2 
Source: ILO, Bulletin of Labour Statistics, 1993 
110 Excluding persons who will begin a new job within 30 days. 
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Table 27 
Number of Female Part-Time Workers and Their Ratio to the Total Number of 
Female Employees in Japan 
Year Female employees Part-time female employee 
Number (1,000)1 Number (1,000) I 	Ratio (%) 
1960 6,390 570 8.9 
1965 8,510 820 9.6 
1970 10,680 1,300 12.2 
1975 11,370 1,980 17.4 
1980 13,230 2,560 19.3 
1988 16,350 3,860 23.6 
1989 17,130 4,320 25.2 
1990 17,950 5,010 27.9 
1991 18,750 5,500 29.3 
1992 19,300 5,920 30.7 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Labor Force Survey, 1993 
Note: Female part-time workers ate those whose working hours during the week surveyed are less 
than 35 hours. 
Table 28 
Structure of Female Part-Time Workers in Japan (1991) 
I 	Rate (%) 
By Industry 




By Size of Firm 




Public Sector Workers 7.2 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Labor Force Survey, 1992 
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Table 29 
Distribution of Part-time Workers by Size of Firm and Industry, and Their Share 
in Total Number of Employees in Japan 
Size of 
Firm 
Percentage Composition Part-timer's share in total employees 
(%) 
1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 




10.7 15.7 16.9 14.0 14.0 15.0 1.4 3.8 5.7 6.7 6.7 8.9 
300-99 
9 
6.4 13.0 10.6 12.6 14.0 12.6 1.6 6.3 7.3 11.0 11.7 12.1 
100-29 
9 
16.3 16.7 16.0 17.4 13.3 16.2 2.9 6.8 8.9 10.8 9.1 12.6 
30-99 20.5 19.9 23.3 23.6 23.1 20.0 3.2 6.7 11.2 14.7 14.2 13.6 



















1.0 0.7 1.1 
. 
2.0 2.6 1.3 0.5 0.7 1.7 4.1 5.4 3.4 
Real 
estate 












0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 
. 
0.9 0.9 2.1 
Servi- 
ces 








698,6 1,458.5 2.295.5 3,330.9 3,658.7 4,666.0 
- 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Survey on Employment Trend, 1992. 
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Table 30 
The distribution of the labor force employed in the „socialist" sector according to 
the main types of time patterns of work 111 
Percentage of employees working in Total 















Industry 92.5 1.7 0.1 1.2 4.5 100.0 
Construction 44.9 42.0 0.2 0.6 12.3 100.0 
Agriculture 75.6 17.4 4.4 0.6 2.0 100.0 
Transport and 
communication 
61.5 14.8 2.1 15.2 6.4 100.0 
Trade 72.0 12.7 5.3 1.9 8.1 100.0 
Water supply 68.7 21.0 0.3 1.2 8.8 100.0 
Other material 
activities 
79.4 9.0 1.1 0.9 9.6 100.0 
Health, social and 
cultural services 
76.5 13.4 1.6 4.2 4.3 100.0 
Total 78.2 11.2 1.5 3.1 6.0 100.0 
Source: Times are changing, working time in 14 industrialized countries, ed. Gerhard Bosch, Peter 
Dawkins and Francois Michon, International Institute for Labor Studies, Geneva, 1993, p. 183 
111 We regard those patterns of work as „fixed", in which the length and arrangement of working 
time - with the exception of certain employees - are determined solely by the employer in a uniform way and 
with a compulsory validity for the whole or larger groups of the manpower stock. Here belong: a) the daily 
working time of equal length and a fixed arrangement; b) unequal working time, in which the number of 
daily working hours to be performed may change by day, week, month or season; c) divided daily working 
time discontinued for a worktime break longer than the usual lunch break; and d) staggered hours in the 
arrangement of which the starting working time is determined differently for geographical areas, for 
enterprises or for groups and departments within them. The „flexible working-time" category includes those 
systems in which both the length and the arrangement of working time is determined by individual 
agreements between the employer and employee. In Hungary, the type which is almost exclusively applied is 
the one in which employees are relatively free to determine their daily starting and finishing times. 
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Table 31 
Industrial Disputes by Demand in Japan 
Year No. of 
Cases 
Classification 




















1970 4,511 2,131 1,260 16 137 28 509 
1975 8,435 5,304 1,971 47 106 32 1,723 
1980 4,376 3,236 722 48 112 26 1,914 
1985 4,826 2,890 595 29 98 26 3,050 
1990 2,071 954 1,123 39 40 16 151 
1991 1,292 775 269 94 45 35 85 
1992 1,138 632 215 83 51 30 55 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Statistical Survey on Industrial Disputes. 
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